Likelihood, two years: 2Unlikely; to end-2028
Likelihood, ten years: 3Possible; to end-2036
Systemic impact: 4Major; global
National impact: 4Major; typical highly exposed nation
Onset pace: Weeks
Duration (acute phase): 1 year
Warning time: Days (first cluster to confirmed novel pathogen)
Scope: Global
Recovery horizon: Months
Capability load: Hard 2/3Soft 3/3Economic 1/3; domains loaded High
Concurrency: Standalone; triggers 2 · triggered by 5
Confidence · movement: low; new

Rated at Standard Severe. Event reach: global event (The likelihood is joint: a pathogen with pandemic potential must emerge within the horizon and the response must then succeed end to end.). Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Upside scenario: impact levels measure the scale of change, not loss.

Capture test: results by nation

03Narrative

Dateline: June 2032

The first cluster of severe respiratory illness was reported by a provincial hospital on 9 March 2031. The genome was uploaded to the shared sequence database four days later and matched no known human pathogen. Under the protocol agreed in advance, the notice went at the same time to international health authorities, regional disease control agencies and 31 contracted manufacturing sites on six continents. Vaccine candidates on two platforms were designed within a week. Validated diagnostic tests reached reference laboratories in 140 nations by day 27. Trial networks that had been funded between outbreaks enrolled their first volunteers in week three. Wastewater sampling showed the pathogen in 14 countries by week six, and those results set the order in which first doses were allocated. Regulators in the participating nations reviewed a single rolling dossier, and the first authorisation was granted on day 96. Manufacturing had started at risk before authorisation. By the end of month six, regional plants had supplied enough doses for health workers, older adults and other priority groups in every participating nation, about 1.4 billion people. No participating government restricted exports, because no single producer supplied more than a fifth of the total. An existing antiviral, repurposed in the first month, reduced admissions among those treated early. The outbreak was not prevented. About 6 per cent of the population of participating nations was infected in the first year, and staffed hospital demand peaked at about 80 per cent of surge capacity in the cities affected first. Elective care was postponed for several weeks in those cities. Schools closed for two to three weeks in fewer than 20 jurisdictions. No participating nation ordered a general lockdown, and borders stayed open with testing at departure. Forecasts of the loss to world output, made in April 2031 at more than 3 per cent, were revised by December to less than half of one per cent. Outcomes differed between nations, and the differences followed capability. Some participating nations received doses on schedule but lacked the vaccinators and cold chain to deliver them outside the main cities, and coverage of priority groups there was below 40 per cent at six months. In others, supply and delivery were adequate but uptake stayed near half of eligible adults, after organised campaigns alleged that the vaccine had been approved without proper testing. Hospitals in those places exceeded capacity for several weeks. States outside the network fared worst. Those that had not shared samples or joined the allocation arrangement received authorised doses four to six months later, and several imposed prolonged movement restrictions in the interval. Suppliers that had expected scarcity pricing sold at the pre-agreed price, and producers of protective equipment were left with unsold stock. The reviews published in 2032 recorded that vaccine design had taken days and that nearly all the remaining time had gone on trials, regulatory coordination, batch release and delivery. They also recorded that consent and public trust had determined outcomes as much as supply had.

The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.

04Summary

A novel pathogen with pandemic potential is detected through shared surveillance and triggers a pre-agreed international response. Validated diagnostics reach participating nations within 30 days of sequence sharing and an effective vaccine receives its first authorisation within 100 days. Regional manufacturers supply enough doses to protect priority groups on every continent within six months. Early treatment and targeted vaccination keep staffed hospital demand below surge capacity in participating nations, and none imposes a general lockdown. The outbreak is contained, not prevented. The test is equitable delivery, trusted consent and regulatory coordination. States outside the network receive countermeasures months later and still experience substantial disruption.

Who gains: Populations of nations inside the surveillance and supply network
Health workers and older adults, who are protected first
Children and students, whose schools stay open
Travel, services and trade-dependent economies
Regional manufacturers holding standing capacity contracts
Who loses: States outside the sharing and allocation network, which lose relative security
Nations that receive doses but cannot deliver them or secure consent
Suppliers that depended on scarcity pricing for vaccines, tests and protective equipment

A shock most would count as progress. It is not upside for everyone: each record names who gains and who loses. Impact levels measure the scale of change, in either direction, and loads mark the capabilities a nation needs in order to capture the gain or absorb the loss.

05Historical anchors

Event	Date	What happened	Calibrates
COVID-19 vaccines	2020	The SARS-CoV-2 genome was published on 10–11 January 2020. One mRNA candidate was designed within days and entered a first human trial on 16 March 2020. The first emergency authorisation of a vaccine tested in large trials was granted in the United Kingdom on 2 December 2020, about 11 months after the sequence.	The baseline to improve on. Design took days; trials, review and manufacturing took the remaining months. The scenario requires that interval to fall by about two thirds.
100 Days Mission	2021	The United Kingdom's G7 presidency proposed, and G7 leaders endorsed in June 2021, a goal of having safe and effective diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines ready within 100 days of a pandemic threat being identified. CEPI adopted the 100-day vaccine goal in its own strategy.	The source of the 100-day authorisation threshold at Standard Severe. It is a stated goal, not a demonstrated capability.
WHO Pandemic Agreement	20 May 2025	The World Health Assembly adopted the agreement by 124 votes in favour, with 11 abstentions and none against. It covers prevention, surveillance, supply and pathogen access with benefit sharing. The annex setting the detailed rules for pathogen access and benefit sharing was left for further negotiation.	The governance the scenario depends on. Adoption shows broad agreement in principle; the unfinished annex and incomplete participation show why some states remain outside the network.
mRNA technology transfer hub	2021 onward	WHO and partners established a technology transfer hub at Afrigen in Cape Town in 2021. Afrigen produced a laboratory-scale mRNA COVID-19 vaccine candidate in early 2022, and the programme shares the technology with 15 partner manufacturers in low- and middle-income countries.	The starting point for regional manufacturing. Transfer of know-how has been shown; sustained commercial-scale output on every continent, which the six-month supply threshold requires, has not.
Ebola ring vaccination	2015–2019	A ring vaccination trial in Guinea in 2015 found no Ebola cases, from ten days after vaccination, among contacts vaccinated immediately. The vaccine was used in the 2018–2020 outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where more than 300,000 people were vaccinated, and was first licensed in November 2019.	Targeted vaccination can contain a live outbreak. It also shows the interval without a prepared platform: four years from field trial to licence.
Mpox response in Africa	2022–2024	Wealthy nations vaccinated at-risk groups during the 2022 global outbreak, while African countries where mpox had long been endemic received almost no doses. Africa CDC and WHO declared emergencies on 13 and 14 August 2024, and the first donated doses reached the Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 2024.	The counter-anchor on equitable delivery. An authorised vaccine existed, and supply still reached the most affected region about two years after wealthy nations. The scenario requires the opposite outcome.

06Parameters

Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.

Common variables at Standard Severe · read-only

1. Severity: major
severe (Standard Severe)
extreme
2. Duration (acute phase): 30 days
90 days
1 year (Standard Severe)
3 years
5 years
3. Onset pace: days
weeks (Standard Severe)
months
years
4. Warning time: none
days (Standard Severe)
months
Standard Severe: days (first cluster to confirmed novel pathogen)
5. Scope: national
regional
global (Standard Severe)
6. Origin: natural (Standard Severe)
accidental
adversarial (great power / neighbour / non-state)
negotiated
7. External support: full (Standard Severe)
partial
none
Standard Severe: full (for participating nations)
8. Concurrency: standalone (Standard Severe)
plus one named scenario
plus two
9. Policy response assumed: none (pure exposure)
current plans executed
best practice (Standard Severe)
10. Recovery horizon: months (Standard Severe)
years
structural

Scenario-specific parameters · read-only

Parameter	Default	Range or options	Note
Days from sequence sharing to validated diagnostics in participating nations	30 days	14 to 60	Validated means independently assessed and available to national reference laboratories.
Days from sequence sharing to first vaccine authorisation	100 days	60 to 200	Initial or emergency authorisation by a stringent regulator, on efficacy data. The COVID-19 baseline was about 11 months.
Months to priority-group doses on every continent	6 months	4 to 12	Priority groups are taken as 20 per cent of the population of participating nations: health workers, older adults and the clinically vulnerable.
Peak staffed hospital demand as a share of surge capacity in participating nations	80 per cent	60 to 100	Above 100 per cent the scenario fails and the event is S10.
Nations participating in the surveillance and supply network	140	60 to 190	Participation means sharing samples and sequences and accepting the allocation arrangement.
Uptake among priority groups offered vaccination	75 per cent	40 to 90	Set nation by nation in practice; it depends on trust and on consent procedures.
Pathogen severity before countermeasures	as in S10: infection fatality ratio of 0.5 per cent	options: milder / more severe	The specification does not fix severity. The S10 pathogen is assumed so that the two scenarios can be compared.

07Transmission channels

1
A novel pathogen emerges. Shared genomic and wastewater surveillance detects it, and sequences and samples are shared within days.
2
The pre-agreed response activates: platform vaccine candidates are designed, trial networks enrol and validated diagnostics reach participating nations within 30 days.
3
Regulators review a common rolling dossier, manufacturing starts at risk and the first authorisation is granted within 100 days.
4
Regional manufacturers on every continent supply priority-group doses within six months under an agreed allocation, which removes the incentive to restrict exports.
5
Health workers, cold chains and credible public communication turn supply into consented vaccination, and early treatment reduces hospital admissions.
6
Staffed hospital demand stays below surge capacity in participating nations, so ordinary care, schooling, work and trade continue without general lockdowns.
7
Nations with weak delivery or low trust capture less of the gain. States outside the network receive countermeasures months later and face prolonged restrictions.
8
Scarcity-dependent suppliers lose pricing power, and the standing capacity needs continued financing once the outbreak ends.

08Capability loading

High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.

Domain	Load	Channel
Hard
Defence and security	Medium	Military logistics and medical units support delivery; biosecurity and assessment of the pathogen's origin.
Strategic infrastructure	High	Laboratories, wastewater sampling, cold chain, hospitals and health data systems carry the response.
Critical technology	High	Vaccine platforms, sequencing, diagnostics and biomanufacturing set the speed of the response.
Soft
Government effectiveness	High	Public health command, regulatory reliance, at-risk procurement and allocation decisions under time pressure.
Human capital	High	The health workforce delivers vaccination and early treatment in every district.
Influence and cohesion	High	Public trust and consent decide uptake; sample and data sharing depend on relations between states.
Economic
Macro-financial	Medium	At-risk purchase financing and standing capacity payments; avoided fiscal and output losses.
Industry, trade and supply	High	Regional production, open trade in countermeasures and supply of vials, lipids and reagents.
Energy and resources	Low	Reliable power for cold chain and plants; no material demand shock.

09Stakeholders

Government: Exposure
Membership of the surveillance and supply network, the speed of regulatory decisions, delivery capacity and public trust decide how much of the gain a nation captures.
Actions
Join pathogen-sharing and allocation arrangements before an outbreak and test them in exercises
Fund trial networks, laboratories and manufacturing capacity between outbreaks under standing contracts
Agree regulatory reliance procedures and settle consent, liability and compensation rules in advance
Watch
Time from sample collection to sequence sharing
Regional manufacturing capacity under contract
Vaccine confidence and uptake among priority groups
Technology: Exposure
Platform developers, sequencing laboratories, diagnostics makers and health data operators supply the response and are bound by pre-agreed price and licensing terms.
Actions
Maintain surge capacity and validated processes under standing contracts
Complete technology transfer to regional manufacturers before an outbreak
Build data exchange that regulators in several jurisdictions can rely on
Watch
Results of platform readiness exercises
Lead times for lipids, vials, enzymes and reagents
Batch release times at regional plants
Investors: Exposure
Avoided losses in travel, services and sovereign credit; capacity payments to manufacturers; loss of scarcity pricing for some suppliers.
Actions
Value standing capacity contracts as well as outbreak sales
Assess sovereign and sector exposure by network membership and delivery capacity
Test holdings in scarcity-dependent suppliers against pre-agreed pricing
Watch
Preparedness financing commitments and disbursements
Terms of advance purchase and capacity reservation agreements
Travel and services activity in affected regions
Public: Exposure
Health, work, schooling and ordinary care continue where vaccination is delivered and accepted; outcomes are worse where it is not.
Actions
Take up vaccination and early treatment when offered, on informed consent
Use official guidance and local health services as the source of information
Accept that health workers and priority groups are vaccinated first
Watch
Official guidance on eligibility and local closures
Local hospital capacity reports
Published safety monitoring results

10Regional exposure

Region	Exposure	Rationale
North America	High	Platform developers and large manufacturers supply the network; contested trust in health authorities limits uptake.
Europe	High	Manufacturing depth and cross-border regulation; ageing populations make the avoided hospital demand large.
China	High	Large manufacturing base and dense cities; the gain depends on timely sharing of samples and data.
Indo-Pacific	High	Strong surveillance and experience of earlier outbreaks; trade-dependent economies gain from open borders.
South Asia	High	Vaccine production in India supplies several regions; density and thin hospital capacity raise the stakes at home.
Gulf and Middle East	Medium	Capital to purchase and small populations; a mobile migrant workforce and mass gatherings test delivery.
Africa	High	Regional plants change the supply position; vaccinators and cold chain outside main cities are the constraint.
Latin America and Caribbean	High	Regional producers in Brazil and Argentina reduce import dependence; primary care delivery and trust set the result.
Russia and Eurasia	High	Domestic vaccine capability but partial participation in sharing arrangements; exclusion delays access for neighbours as well.

11Early-warning indicators

Indicator	Source	Threshold
Days from sample collection to public sequence sharing for novel pathogens	GISAID	Under 14 days
Progress against the 100 Days Mission scorecard for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines	International Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat	—
Vaccine manufacturing capacity and completed technology transfers by region	CEPI, WHO	Commercial-scale capacity on every continent
Ratification of the WHO Pandemic Agreement and adoption of its pathogen access and benefit-sharing annex	WHO	60 ratifications, the number required for entry into force
Self-assessed International Health Regulations core capacities	WHO State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting	—
Preparedness financing committed and disbursed	Pandemic Fund	—
Doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 population	WHO National Health Workforce Accounts	Below 44.5 per 10,000, the WHO shortage threshold
Public confidence in vaccines and in health authorities	Vaccine Confidence Project, Wellcome Global Monitor	—

12Compounds

Triggers: S19 Chronic disease advance · Regional production, broad licensing and primary care delivery proven in the outbreak carry over to preventive treatments.
S18 Public service leap · Vaccination registers and consent records demonstrate interoperable public digital systems in use.
Triggered by: S17 Automated discovery step · Faster candidate design, automated experiments and shorter validation.
S13 Great-power détente · Lower barriers between the largest powers ease sample, data and technology sharing.
S11 Debt service reset · Released fiscal capacity funds health workers, laboratories and cold chain in distressed states.
S18 Public service leap · Identity and consent-based data exchange support allocation, vaccination records and safety monitoring.
S19 Chronic disease advance · Licensing practice, regulatory reliance and regional medicines production built here raise readiness for a distributed outbreak response
Natural emergence of a novel pathogen with pandemic potential
Amplified by: S10 Severe pandemic · The same class of pathogen. The more severe the pathogen, the larger the gain inside the network and the loss outside it.
Amplifying trends: Adaptable vaccine platformsPathogen emergence pressureGlobal health governanceRegional medicines manufacturingPublic communication in crisisAdaptive regulationHealth workforce scarcityConspiracy movements & science denial
Key trends: Global health governanceCritical Adaptable vaccine platformsCritical Regional medicines manufacturingVery high Pathogen emergence pressureVery high
From GINC Trends: the trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario, of 250. All S20 trend scores.

13Rating rationale

Rating	Band or level	Why
Likelihood, two years	2Unlikely	Two conditions must coincide. Published estimates put the annual probability of a pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 near 2 per cent, so a qualifying outbreak within two years is itself unlikely. The response has never run end to end: the fastest first authorisation on record took about 11 months, the pathogen-sharing annex to the 2025 agreement was left for later negotiation and regional manufacturing is at an early stage. The joint probability sits within 0.2 to 1 per cent.
Likelihood, ten years	3Possible	Over ten years the chance of a qualifying outbreak rises to roughly one in five on the same estimates, and platform, surveillance and manufacturing capacity should mature. Success still requires speed, equitable supply and public consent together, and the record of 2020–2022 shows that each can fail separately. Assuming the response succeeds in about one outbreak in six gives a joint probability near 3 per cent, inside the 1 to 5 per cent band.
Systemic impact	4Major	Rated as the scale of change against the unmitigated case. The IMF projected the cumulative output loss from COVID-19 at about US$13.8 trillion through 2024, and Lloyd's puts the five-year probability-weighted loss from a human pandemic at US$13.6 trillion. Avoiding most of a loss of that order in participating economies is worth 2.5 to 5 per cent of global output over five years. The gain is not universal: non-participants keep much of the loss.
National impact	4Major	For a highly exposed participating nation the highest dimensions are human welfare and essential services: hospitals stay within staffed capacity, ordinary care and schooling continue and no general lockdown is imposed. Output in several large European economies fell by more than 7 per cent in 2020, and avoiding most of such a loss is a major change. It is not rated transformative because the outbreak still causes deaths, local closures and postponed care.
Confidence	low	All three panel members gave the same ratings, but the mechanism has never operated end to end and the likelihood is the product of two uncertain estimates.

Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the scenario methodology page.

14Open questions

Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.

Whether this is a scenario in its own right or the best-practice policy response to S10, and how the two should be run together without counting the same outbreak twice.
The specification does not fix the severity of the pathogen. The size of the gain depends on it, and this record assumes the S10 pathogen for comparability.
How to rate a nation that is inside the network but cannot deliver doses or is not believed by its public. Regional exposure does not separate these cases from nations outside the network.
Whether priority-group supply on every continent within six months is consistent with regional manufacturing capacity as it stands, particularly in Africa.

15Commentary

No signed commentary in this build.

16Version and citation

Version: 0.5.0 · active · outbreak-defence-succeeds
Change log: 0.5.0 · 9 October 2026 · Rebuilt in the second pass from Hundred-day pandemic defence: likelihood lowered one band at both horizons, thresholds added for diagnostics, six-month supply and hospital capacity, loads for strategic infrastructure, industry and defence raised and the losers named.
Full change log

Rating history

One row per edition. Each edition page is frozen at release; corrections are published as errata.

Edition	Rank	L2y	L10y	Systemic	National	Confidence	Edition view
2027	Not ranked	2Unlikely	3Possible	4Major	4Major	low	Open

Versions

Version	Date	Change
0.5.0	9 October 2026	Rebuilt in the second pass from Hundred-day pandemic defence: likelihood lowered one band at both horizons, thresholds added for diagnostics, six-month supply and hospital capacity, loads for strategic infrastructure, industry and defence raised and the losers named.

Citation and downloads

Cite as

GINC (2027). Scenario S20 A live outbreak proves rapid distributed pandemic defence, Scenario Library v0.5. scenarios.ginc.org/scenarios/outbreak-defence-succeeds

Content and data are published under CC BY 4.0.

Download JSON Download CSV