Scenarios
The stable set of named scenarios. Each has a permanent slug and identifier, a schema-identical record and a rating history. Read them as a list, or side by side: by lens, by region or as each one unfolds.
Release: TBC January 2027 · 20 scenarios in 5 families · 10 ranked · 10 upside
AEconomic and tradeEconomic and trade
| ID | Scenario | Status | First edition | Editions ranked | Latest L2y | Latest impact | Rating history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 | Critical trade divides into rival blocs | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 4Severe4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S02 | A global funding seizure reaches sovereign balance sheets | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 4Severe4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S11 | A creditor agreement releases fiscal capacity↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 2Unlikely | 3Significant4Major | 2027: band 2 |
| S12 | A cross-regional market access compact redirects investment↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 3Possible | 3Significant4Major | 2027: band 3 |
BGeopolitical and securityGeopolitical and security
| ID | Scenario | Status | First edition | Editions ranked | Latest L2y | Latest impact | Rating history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S03 | A regional war closes a globally important sea route | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 4Severe4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S04 | Hybrid coercion ends in an infrastructure blackout | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 2Moderate4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S05 | A disputed transfer of power breaks effective government | active | 2027 | 2027 | 2Unlikely | 1Limited4Severe | 2027: band 2 |
| S13 | A great-power agreement lowers economic security barriers↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 1Remote | 4Major4Major | 2027: band 1 |
| S14 | A verified Middle East settlement restores access↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 2Unlikely | 3Significant4Major | 2027: band 2 |
CEnergy, climate and resourcesEnergy, climate and resources
| ID | Scenario | Status | First edition | Editions ranked | Latest L2y | Latest impact | Rating history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S06 | Two breadbasket failures trigger a food availability crisis | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 3Significant4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S07 | A major disaster disables the national economic core | active | 2027 | 2027 | 2Unlikely | 1Limited4Severe | 2027: band 2 |
| S15 | Cheap firm clean power becomes available at scale↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 3Possible | 4Major4Major | 2027: band 3 |
| S16 | A validated farming package raises water-efficient output↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 3Possible | 3Significant4Major | 2027: band 3 |
DTechnology and infrastructureTechnology and infrastructure
| ID | Scenario | Status | First edition | Editions ranked | Latest L2y | Latest impact | Rating history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S08 | An AI deployment step causes abrupt labour displacement | active | 2027 | 2027 | 3Possible | 3Significant4Severe | 2027: band 3 |
| S09 | A cryptographic breakthrough invalidates digital trust | active | 2027 | 2027 | 1Remote | 3Significant4Severe | 2027: band 1 |
| S17 | AI-directed research produces a reproducible discovery step↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 3Possible | 4Major4Major | 2027: band 3 |
| S18 | A public service platform reaches inclusive operation↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 2Unlikely | 1Limited4Major | 2027: band 2 |
EHealthHealth
| ID | Scenario | Status | First edition | Editions ranked | Latest L2y | Latest impact | Rating history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S10 | A novel respiratory pathogen exceeds health surge capacity | active | 2027 | 2027 | 2Unlikely | 4Severe4Severe | 2027: band 2 |
| S19 | Affordable preventive treatments reduce chronic illness↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 3Possible | 3Significant4Major | 2027: band 3 |
| S20 | A live outbreak proves rapid distributed pandemic defence↗ upside | active | 2027 | — | 2Unlikely | 4Major4Major | 2027: band 2 |
Latest impact shows systemic, then national. The rating history plots two-year likelihood by edition; it holds one point until the second edition.
What each scenario looks like from inside it, read across six standard lenses: political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental. Scenarios run down the page in edition order; scroll sideways for every column.
| Scenario | Political | Economic | Social | Technological | Legal | Environmental |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 · Rank 1Trade bloc ruptureAEconomic and trade | Governments outside the blocs are pressed to adopt one rule book. Exemptions are granted product by product, each with a condition on alignment. | Prices of the affected inputs double and world trade volume falls 10 per cent over two years. Inflation is highest in economies that import from both blocs. | Export-sector jobs are lost in manufacturing regions and households lose purchasing power. Some antibiotics are placed under allocation. | Chips, chip-making tools, magnets and cloud services need licences that are not issued. Incompatible standards leave products approved in one bloc refused in the other. | Customs administers origin audits and end-user certificates under two regimes. Most states have no legal basis for allocating scarce industrial inputs. | Shortages of magnets and power semiconductors delay clean-energy equipment. New mines and processing plants are approved under shortened environmental review. |
| S02 · Rank 2Global funding seizureAEconomic and trade | The central dispute is who bears the losses: bank creditors, taxpayers or foreign lenders. Governments that guarantee all bank liabilities weaken their own credit. | Global equities fall 40 per cent and cross-border private lending contracts by a quarter. Funding markets stay impaired for nine months. | Unemployment rises. Where the state loses market access, public salaries are paid late and fuel and medicines are rationed. | Deposits leave through mobile applications within hours. Data-centre and venture financing contracts, while payment and settlement systems must keep operating. | Resolution regimes and deposit insurance limits decide where losses fall. Divided creditor groups slow sovereign restructuring. | Commodity demand and prices fall. Clean energy and adaptation projects lose financing as lenders withdraw from long-dated assets. |
| S03 · Rank 3Regional war spilloverBGeopolitical and security | Allied governments are asked for ships, interceptors and basing while neither side wins quickly. Alliance cohesion is tested past the third month. | Oil doubles and gas rises fourfold at the peak. War-risk insurance triples and central banks tighten against supply-driven inflation. | Governments run evacuation, reception of displaced people and fuel rationing together. Reservists are recalled in belligerent and partner states. | Drones, missiles and cyber operations damage ports and communications. Interceptors are used faster than they are made. | War-risk underwriters withdraw cover within days. Sanctions, neutrality and freedom of navigation are contested throughout. | Strikes on terminals and tankers put enclosed waters at risk of oil spills. Importers burn more coal while gas is short. |
| S06 · Rank 4Breadbasket failureCEnergy, climate and resources | Governments are judged on whether distribution is seen to be fair. Exporters restrict sales to protect domestic consumers and upstream states control releases from shared rivers. | Staple prices double for 18 months. Import bills and subsidies rise together and drain foreign exchange; exporters with normal harvests and holders of usable stocks gain. | Poor urban households and small farmers carry the loss. Child malnutrition rises in low-income importing countries and rationing tests public order. | Early crop forecasts and transfer systems that reach households within weeks decide the quality of the response. Drought-tolerant seed and efficient irrigation limit the second-season loss. | Export quotas and licences void commercial contracts under force majeure clauses. Trade rules permit temporary food export restrictions and many water-sharing treaties lack binding enforcement. | Extreme heat and drought strike two regions in one season. Low reservoirs cut irrigation and hydropower, and degraded soils and depleted aquifers slow recovery. |
| S08 · Rank 5AI labour shockDTechnology and infrastructure | Legislatures debate taxes on automated work, limits on deployment in regulated professions and wage insurance. Few have legislated by the third year. | Output and profits rise while employment-linked receipts fall 10 per cent below plan. Gains accrue to model owners and leading adopters. | Entry-level recruitment halves in affected occupations. Fewer young adults expect to be better off than their parents. | Agents complete whole workflows, not single tasks, at a cost per task that falls by more than half in a year. | Liability for agent errors and the rules of licensed professions decide how fast roles can be removed. | Inference demand raises electricity load where data centres cluster. The effect is secondary to the labour shock. |
| S04 · Rank 6Hybrid coercionBGeopolitical and security | The adversary offers restraint in exchange for a policy concession. Allies consult and send engineers but agree no collective measure. | Areas producing half of national output stop for 72 hours and work reduced hours for 30 days. Insurers exclude state-backed sabotage and investors defer plants. | A forged document blames neglected maintenance. Contested attribution divides opinion on whether the government is failing or exaggerating. | Concealed access to grid and telecommunications control systems is activated. Engineers restore supply by hand because remote control cannot be trusted. | No single incident is an act of war. Legal powers below that threshold, over operators, vessels and evidence, decide how quickly the state can act. | Damage falls on subsea cables and energy assets. Lasting environmental harm is limited unless pipelines or fuel storage are ruptured. |
| S10 · Rank 7Severe pandemicEHealth | Governments allocate scarce treatment and restrict movement at the same time. Credible communication determines how long measures hold. | Workplace absence peaks at 15 per cent and contact-intensive sectors close. Governments borrow to support incomes while revenue falls. | Hospital demand reaches twice staffed capacity, so ordinary care is rationed. School closures fall hardest on pupils without connectivity at home. | Sequencing is fast but vaccines are unavailable at scale for nine months. Manufacturing location sets the order of access. | Emergency powers, treatment allocation rules and export restrictions on medical goods are adopted within weeks and reviewed only afterwards. | The pathogen emerges through animal-to-human spillover. Energy demand and emissions fall temporarily as mobility drops. |
| S05 · Rank 8Legitimacy ruptureBGeopolitical and security | Two claimants each cite a lawful basis. Competing claims to lawful authority last six months and security forces obey selectively. | The currency falls 18 per cent and two bond auctions are cancelled. Output runs 5 per cent below its previous path. | Normal administration stops in areas holding 20 per cent of the population. Public salaries are paid late and clinics run short of medicines. | A synthetic video is viewed 14 million times and the correction reaches a tenth of that audience. Mobile data is restricted under emergency decree. | One side treats the court's suspension of certification as binding and the other does not. Emergency provisions pass into ordinary law. | Physical assets and natural systems are undamaged. Permitting and environmental enforcement lapse in areas outside normal administration. |
| S07 · Rank 9Core disasterCEnergy, climate and resources | The inquiry asks what was known beforehand. Accountability for known weaknesses, more than the hazard itself, decides whether the government keeps public confidence. | Direct damage equals 8 per cent of GDP and insurance covers less than half. The remainder falls on households, small firms, municipalities and the central budget. | A tenth of the population is affected. Households without insurance, bank accounts or identity documents wait longest for housing and payments. | Alerts reach phones in time, but mobile coverage fails in flooded districts within hours. Registries restored from a second site decide when payments start. | Building codes and land-use rules set the scale of damage long before the event. Insurers withdraw cover from the worst-affected districts afterwards. | The locally relevant hazard is flood, storm, fire, heat or earthquake. Warming raises the frequency of the climate-related variants. |
| S09 · Rank 10Cryptographic trust breakDTechnology and infrastructure | Archived diplomatic traffic becomes readable and is disclosed selectively. Forged documents with valid old signatures weaken official denials. | Some cross-border payment and signing services are restricted for 90 days. Emergency migration takes 12 months and manual verification raises transaction costs. | Health, tax and messaging records from earlier years must be assumed exposed. Confidence in digital records and official statements falls. | RSA and elliptic-curve algorithms fail together. Devices that cannot be updated in the field set the pace of recovery. | Courts must rule on documents signed with broken algorithms. Legislatures pass validating acts and repudiation claims rise. | There is no direct environmental effect. Replacement of embedded devices adds electronic waste, and energy control systems run under manual assurance. |
| S11 · Upside ↗Debt service resetAEconomic and trade | Chinese state lenders accept common terms alongside other official creditors. States that stayed current through spending cuts say the framework favours those that did not. | Debt service falls 40 per cent for five years. Participants move to selective default at signing and most are upgraded later; non-participants pay higher spreads for a period. | Released funds reach clinics and schools where budgets are credible. Elsewhere they go to wages and subsidies before elections. | The technology load is low. Debt recording and open tender systems make the conditions verifiable, and imported equipment becomes affordable again. | Statutes in New York and London limit holdout recoveries. A most-favoured-creditor clause enforces comparable treatment, and litigation by two funds fails. | Suspended power and water projects restart under concessional lending. Resource-backed loans are renegotiated, which reduces pressure to pledge future commodity output. |
| S12 · Upside ↗Market access openingAEconomic and trade | Six non-members applied to join in 2031. The conditions set for applicants became the compact's main source of influence over economies outside it. | Member trade ran 20 per cent above its prior path by 2031 and announced productive investment 30 per cent above. Most of it went to a small number of places. | Recognised qualifications let nurses and engineers leave poorer members for richer ones. Training colleges in the new corridors could not supply enough technicians. | Members whose customs systems accepted electronic certificates and traceability records saw suppliers qualify within months; others waited more than a year. | One rule of origin let inputs from any member count towards qualifying content. Three governments used the safeguard clause for protected producers. | Two members rationed industrial power connections as new plants arrived. Shared traceability records made the origin of products and inputs auditable across members. |
| S13 · Upside ↗Great-power détenteBGeopolitical and security | Allied governments were not party to the talks. Sovereignty claims are unchanged and each legislature contests verification. | Restricted trade worth at least 1 per cent of global GDP reopens within 18 months. Protected producers and diversion economies lose orders. | Prices of traded goods ease. Jobs in protected plants and in export zones built on diverted trade are at risk. | Controls on mature chips, rare earths and commercial software give way to a published list. Restrictions on advanced and military-use items remain. | A joint commission publishes compliance data and runs a 90-day dispute procedure. Either party may withdraw on six months' notice. | Trade in solar modules, batteries and processed minerals reopens, lowering the cost of clean energy equipment. Alternative mining projects lose their premium. |
| S14 · Upside ↗Middle East settlementBGeopolitical and security | The framework set shipping guarantees, monitored ceasefires and inspections without settling borders or recognition. Factions in each signatory state contested it. | War-risk insurance costs halved within 12 months. Reconstruction commitments reached 10 per cent of conflict-affected participants' combined annual GDP over three years. | Residents returned and stayed where services were restored. Amnesties and trials were contested from the start. | Verification relied on remote monitoring and resident inspectors. Rebuilt power and telecommunications networks set the pace of return. | Each inspection report released a stage of sanctions relief. Property claims and accountability for wartime conduct filled the courts. | Shorter voyages cut shipping fuel use. Reconstruction began with unexploded ordnance, rubble and damaged water systems. |
| S15 · Upside ↗Clean power thresholdCEnergy, climate and resources | Advantage moves to states that approve lines and plant quickly. Hydrocarbon-dependent governments lose fiscal room before export volumes fall and their leverage over importers declines. | Industrial electricity costs fall 30 per cent in early adopters within five years. Energy-intensive investment relocates; reserves and fossil plant are written down. | Households gain later than industry because network charges rise. Coal, oil and gas regions lose employment faster than retraining schemes absorb it. | The step is verification, not invention: standard combined plants pass independent reliability trials in several climate zones. Transformers, cable, rigs and minerals then run short. | Permitting and connection rules decide the outcome. Wholesale markets need reform to pay for firm capacity and early plant closures bring compensation claims. | Fossil generation is displaced on cost and power-sector emissions fall faster than planned. Mining for lithium, copper and graphite expands, with local land and water costs. |
| S16 · Upside ↗Water-efficient food leapCEnergy, climate and resources | Thirty-one governments sign three linked agreements on seed approval, finance and extension. Exporting regions ask for farm support. | International staple prices fall 15 per cent. Importers' food bills and inflation fall; high-cost exporters lose farm income. | Where credit requires a land title, larger farms adopt first and take most of the gain. Stunting falls only where the package reached. | No component is new. The finding is that the combination transfers across crops, soils and climate zones. | A variety approved by one regulator is registered by the others within 90 days. Trait fees are capped for small farms; three states delay after court challenges. | Water use per tonne falls 30 per cent, but total withdrawals do not fall until regulators set basin limits. |
| S17 · Upside ↗Automated discovery stepDTechnology and infrastructure | Governments compete on laboratories, evaluators and approval pathways. Fourteen countries adopt tiered access rules for dual-use design capability; others do not. | Qualifying programmes halve time and cost per validated candidate. Contract research and early-stage pipelines built on long cycles are written down. | Patients gain where regulators and health systems can absorb new candidates. Research staff move to equipped sites, widening the gap between nations. | Eleven independent laboratories reproduce the whole loop in three fields, not all of science. Automated laboratories, not access to systems, become the constraint. | Inventorship and evidence rules diverge across jurisdictions. Patent offices and medicines regulators become the limiting step. | New electrolytes, catalysts and enzymes reduce energy and material use in industry, while compute and automated laboratories add electricity demand. |
| S18 · Upside ↗Public service leapDTechnology and infrastructure | Displaced agents and officials who controlled files resist the transfer of records through courts and stoppages. The government holds the switch to published tests. | The tax compliance gap narrows by a quarter and benefit delivery time falls 80 per cent. Intermediaries lose most of their fee income within a year. | Assisted offline access serves the adults the digital route fails: older manual workers, minority-language speakers and people without a phone. | Identity, payments and consent-based data exchange run as interoperable public systems. Automated eligibility decisions need review before and after deployment. | A data protection authority able to refuse the state, and a right to redress, decide whether operation respects rights. | Direct environmental effects are small. The systems need continuous power and connectivity, so outages from heat, flood or storm test the offline route. |
| S19 · Upside ↗Chronic disease advanceEHealth | Health ministers are judged against neighbours: they are asked why outcomes differ when the price does not. Pension age returns to the legislature. | Admissions fall and participation rises, but pension and annuity liabilities are revised up and providers paid for treating complications lose revenue. | Treated patients have 30 per cent fewer major complications. Uptake follows access to primary care, so gaps within nations widen where care is thin. | The advance is a combination of known and new medicines guided by a low-cost marker panel, supported by decision software and made by regional producers. | Broad non-exclusive licences set the price. Regulators must approve the combination, fix eligibility thresholds and permit pharmacists and health workers to monitor patients. | Environmental effects are small. Food demand shifts modestly where appetite-reducing treatments are widely used, and new production sites add pharmaceutical effluent to control. |
| S20 · Upside ↗Outbreak defence succeedsEHealth | The response ran on a protocol agreed in advance, not on negotiation during the outbreak. States that had not shared samples or joined the allocation waited four to six months longer. | Forecast losses to world output were revised from more than 3 per cent to less than half of one per cent. Suppliers expecting scarcity pricing sold at the pre-agreed price. | Uptake stayed near half of eligible adults where campaigns alleged inadequate testing, and hospitals there exceeded capacity. Elsewhere schools closed for two to three weeks in a few jurisdictions. | Vaccine design took days and the first authorisation came on day 96. Trials, batch release and delivery took nearly all the remaining time. | Regulators reviewed a single rolling dossier, and agreed allocation rules meant no participating government restricted exports. Consent and liability rules were settled in advance. | The pathogen emerged naturally and was tracked by wastewater sampling in 14 countries by week six. The success does not reduce the pressure of emergence. |
Overview cells are summaries of each scenario's own record, written with the record in the second pass: its narrative, transmission channels, loading table and regional rationale. Bold marks the phrase to read first. Source: model-panel-v0.5. Download as CSV.
What is happening in each region under each scenario. Every cell carries the region’s exposure rating. Scenarios run down the page in edition order; scroll sideways for every column.
| Scenario | North America | Europe | China | Indo-Pacific | South Asia | Gulf and Middle East | Africa | Latin America and Caribbean | Russia and Eurasia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 · Rank 1Trade bloc ruptureAEconomic and trade | HighA principal in the rupture. It controls chip technology but depends on the opposing bloc for processed rare earths, magnets and medicine ingredients. | HighExport manufacturing buys inputs from one bloc and sells to both. With little domestic processing, vehicle and equipment plants stop within weeks. | HighA principal in the rupture. It loses advanced chips and tools and its largest export markets, and answers with licensing of materials. | HighThe region assembles for both blocs. Plants in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN need inputs from one side and tools from the other. | MediumIndia and its neighbours gain diverted orders, but pharmaceutical and electronics output depends on imported ingredients and components. | MediumEnergy sales continue to both blocs. Re-export hubs, technology purchases and investment funds face secondary restrictions. | MediumMineral exporters gain bargaining power. Importers pay more, and finance and equipment arrive with conditions on standards. | MediumCommodity exporters sell to both blocs. Mexico's manufacturing is bound to one, and lithium and copper attract rival offers. | HighRussia is already under sanctions and reliant on one bloc. Central Asian transit states face secondary restrictions on re-exports. |
| S02 · Rank 2Global funding seizureAEconomic and trade | HighOrigin of the repricing in technology and commercial property. Central bank purchases and swap lines keep core dollar markets working. | HighBanks hold property loans and domestic government debt. High-debt members face the widest spreads. | HighProperty and local government debt losses deepen and export demand falls. Capital controls limit outflows. | MediumOpen capital accounts transmit the shock, but reserves and surpluses absorb much of it. | HighLow reserves and large refinancing needs. Foreign currency for fuel and medicines runs short. | MediumSovereign funds take valuation losses and oil revenue falls. Reserves protect the exporters, not the importers of the region. | HighBond market access closes and trade finance is withdrawn. Divided creditors delay restructuring. | HighDepreciation and lower commodity prices arrive together and raise the cost of foreign-currency debt. | MediumCommodity revenue falls. Central Asian borrowers are exposed; Russia is largely outside Western funding markets. |
| S03 · Rank 3Regional war spilloverBGeopolitical and security | HighForces and munitions are committed under alliance obligations. Net energy exports do not shield consumers from world prices. | HighLNG, jet fuel and diesel run short and trade with Asia is rerouted. Allied obligations and displaced people add to the load. | HighThe world's largest crude importer loses Gulf supply, and is a belligerent in the East Asian variant. | HighJapan, Korea and Taiwan import most of their energy by sea and ration industrial users within weeks. | HighCrude, LNG and Gulf remittances all depend on the theatre, and fiscal buffers are thin. | HighThe theatre of the default case: facilities are struck and exports stop, and residents and migrant workers are displaced. | MediumRated Medium: fuel, food and fertiliser costs rise and East African freight is disrupted, while some oil exporters gain. | MediumRated Medium: distant from the fighting. Importers pay more for fuel and fertiliser; oil and grain exporters gain. | HighExporters gain on price, but Black Sea and Baltic variants place the region in the theatre. |
| S06 · Rank 4Breadbasket failureCEnergy, climate and resources | MediumPhysical supply is secure. The region is a candidate failing region; drought there cuts western water and hydropower and raises food inflation. | MediumA net cereal exporter facing food inflation and costly fertiliser. Southern water stress and pressure from neighbouring importers add to the load. | HighThe largest buyer of soya beans and feed grain, with water stress in the north. Reserves cover the first year; rebuilding them tightens world supply. | MediumRice importers and Pacific islands are exposed. Australia, Thailand and Vietnam export and gain unless their own harvests fail. | HighHeat and a weak monsoon cut domestic wheat and rice. Shared rivers are disputed, undernutrition is already high and fiscal space is thin. | HighMost staples are imported and water is scarce. Gulf states can outbid other buyers; Egypt, Yemen and the Levant cannot. | HighImport-dependent cities, rain-fed farming and low reserves of grain and foreign exchange. Existing acute food insecurity is the highest of any region. | MediumBrazil and Argentina export and may gain or be a failing region. Caribbean and Central American importers carry the exposure. | MediumExporter windfalls for Russia and Kazakhstan unless they are a failing region. Central Asian water sharing and importers in the Caucasus are exposed. |
| S08 · Rank 5AI labour shockDTechnology and infrastructure | HighHome of the model owners and early adopters. Fast displacement follows from large professional services employment and flexible dismissal rules. | HighRevenue depends on labour taxation and few frontier providers are domestic, so displacement arrives without most of the profit. | HighDomestic models and rapid adoption meet high graduate unemployment and a large clerical workforce. | HighOutsourcing in the Philippines and regional services centres are exposed. Ageing workforces in Japan and Korea soften the effect. | HighIT and business process exports are the main source of graduate employment in India and are renegotiated at lower volumes. | MediumPublic sector and expatriate professional work are exposed. Capital for adoption is available and labour taxation is light. | MediumSmall formal services sectors limit direct displacement. The route to services-led growth is at risk. | MediumNearshore services and urban professional employment are exposed. Large informal sectors limit the measured share. | MediumRestricted access to frontier models slows adoption. IT outsourcing and public administration are exposed. |
| S04 · Rank 6Hybrid coercionBGeopolitical and security | MediumRated Medium. Advisories in 2024 confirmed access placed in advance in communications, energy and water operators. | HighThe most active theatre: Baltic cable damage, drone incursions, airport closures and incendiary parcels since 2022. | LowRated Low as a target. State control of operators and networks limits the reach of a deniable campaign. | HighTaiwan's subsea cables, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Australia face coercion at sea and intrusion into operators. | MediumRated Medium. Campaigns below the threshold of war are established between neighbours, and grids have little reserve. | MediumRated Medium. Drone and proxy attacks on energy and desalination assets are the regional form. | LowRated Low. Few states face a capable state adversary with motive, although grids are fragile. | LowRated Low. State-directed coercion of this kind is rare in the region. | HighUkraine, Moldova and Georgia are direct targets. Grid attack by cyber means was first used at scale in this region. |
| S10 · Rank 7Severe pandemicEHealth | HighA strong countermeasure industry is offset by low trust in health authorities and fragmented delivery. | HighOld populations and workforce shortages mean staffed capacity is exceeded early in the first affected cities. | HighDense cities and a large older population. Manufacturing depth is set against the cost of prolonged restrictions. | HighTravel hubs spread the pathogen early. Several states have strong outbreak response; island states depend on imported countermeasures. | HighStaffed beds and oxygen are limited for dense populations. Vaccine output is large but subject to export restriction. | MediumYoung populations and fiscal resources limit losses in the Gulf. Migrant worker housing and conflict-affected health systems carry the exposure. | HighThe fewest health workers per head and the latest vaccine access. Routine immunisation and maternal care are displaced. | HighInformal workers cannot isolate without income, and fiscal room for prolonged support is limited. | HighOlder populations with chronic illness, uneven regional capacity and low vaccine confidence. |
| S05 · Rank 8Legitimacy ruptureBGeopolitical and security | MediumRated Medium. Certification was disrupted for hours in 2021, but courts, officials and security forces held. | MediumRated Medium. Romania's 2024 annulment shows the judicial pathway, with administration continuing throughout. | LowRated Low. There is no electoral transfer and a succession dispute would follow a different pathway. | MediumRated Medium. Disputed counts and military involvement have precedents in parts of ASEAN and the Pacific. | HighRated High. Bangladesh in 2024 and Nepal in 2025 show rapid loss of authority once protest spreads. | HighRated High. Succession and constitutional rulings are the likely triggers, and some states have armed groups outside the state chain of command. | HighRated High. Kenya in 2007 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 are the direct precedents for rival claims and lost output. | HighRated High. Bolivia in 2019 shows police refusal of orders deciding a disputed count within three weeks. | HighRated High. Disputed counts have brought mass protest and annulment, with open external backing for one side. |
| S07 · Rank 9Core disasterCEnergy, climate and resources | HighInsurer withdrawal is the distinctive exposure. The 2025 Los Angeles wildfires cost insurers around US$40 billion. | MediumRiver floods and heat, with dispersed activity limiting the national effect. Valencia in 2024 showed that alerting can still fail. | HighTyphoons, floods and earthquakes threaten the delta city clusters that carry much of national output and exports. | HighTyphoons and earthquakes reach capital regions directly. In Pacific island states the core is the country. | HighMonsoon floods, cyclones, heat and earthquakes meet low insurance cover. Pakistan's 2022 floods affected about 33 million people. | MediumHeat and flash floods are rising. Türkiye and Iran carry the region's seismic risk; Gulf states hold fiscal buffers. | HighFast-growing coastal and river cities face floods and cyclones with little arranged finance and thin drainage. | HighHurricanes, earthquakes and El Niño floods strike dominant capital cities. Caribbean states can lose more than a year's output. | MediumCentral Asian capitals sit on active faults. Russian activity is dispersed; wildfire and river floods are the main hazards. |
| S09 · Rank 10Cryptographic trust breakDTechnology and infrastructure | HighThe largest concentration of cloud, certificate and payment services, with extensive archived government traffic and strong migration capacity. | HighHeavy reliance on qualified electronic signatures and national identity schemes, with migration timetables that differ between member states. | HighA large state and financial estate on public-key systems. Exposure depends on which power holds the capability. | HighAdvanced digital economies with dense trade documentation. Alliance communications are intelligence targets. | MediumVery large identity and payment systems in India, with lower digital dependence elsewhere in the region. | HighFinancial centres, energy trading and state communications are high-value targets, with high reliance on foreign security suppliers. | MediumLower digital dependence, but mobile money and new identity systems use imported cryptography with thin local migration capacity. | MediumInstant payment systems and digital tax administration are exposed. State archives are a lesser target. | HighState archives are prime intelligence targets, and sanctions limit access to replacement hardware and validated modules. |
| S11 · Upside ↗Debt service resetAEconomic and trade | LowA creditor region with little direct gain. New York law governs many of the bonds, so its legislation decides how holdouts are treated. | LowOfficial creditors and London-law bonds place Europe on the creditor side. Losses are small relative to its financial system. | MediumThe largest official bilateral creditor extends maturities on most claims and accepts common terms, which sets a precedent for its future lending. | MediumLaos and several Pacific island states are candidates for treatment. Japan is a major official creditor and records losses. | HighPakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are candidates. The release is large relative to revenue, and delivery capacity decides the result. | MediumEgypt, Jordan and Lebanon are candidate debtors. Gulf states are creditors and depositors whose claims must be treated comparably. | HighMost participating states are African. Interest bills had exceeded health or education spending in many of them, so the release is largest here. | HighArgentina, Bolivia and Ecuador are candidates, with several Caribbean states. Bond-heavy debt makes private creditor participation decisive. | MediumThe Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan owe large sums to Chinese lenders and could qualify. Russia is a bilateral creditor to both. |
| S12 · Upside ↗Market access openingAEconomic and trade | MediumMexico gains qualifying assembly work as a candidate member. Protected producers in the larger economies lose share to member exporters. | MediumMachinery and services exporters gain access to growing markets. Protected farm and vehicle producers face stronger competition from members. | MediumChinese firms invest inside member states to qualify under the rule of origin. Some assembly moves to member neighbours. | HighSouth-East Asian members take vehicle component and electronics lines moved from non-member suppliers. Advanced members supply capital and services. | HighPorts on the corridor to East Africa fill. Standards laboratories and customs decide which exporters qualify in months and which wait a year. | MediumA supplier of capital, energy and transhipment to the new corridors between South Asia, Africa and Europe. | HighEast African processing zones join a corridor from South Asia. The widest gap opens between members that qualify suppliers and neighbours that are bypassed. | HighMembers gain component and food-processing investment. Closely competing non-members record lower investment and face tariffs their rivals no longer pay. | LowLargely outside the compact. Little new investment arrives and overland transit loses some trade to the new sea corridors. |
| S13 · Upside ↗Great-power détenteBGeopolitical and security | HighThe United States is a party. Consumers and exporters gain; plants financed on a tariff margin report losses and Mexico's nearshoring trade slows. | HighRenewed Chinese competition arrives without tariff parity. Governments review de-risking policy and hold defence spending flat. | HighParty to the agreement: export access is restored and selected technology inputs return, under quarterly monitoring. | HighIncident risk around Taiwan falls. Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand lose diverted orders and allies review their defence plans. | MediumIndia loses part of its diversion gain and some leverage. Cheaper inputs offset a share of the loss. | MediumStronger trade supports energy demand, with less room to balance between the two powers. | MediumMineral exporters lose the premium from rival bidding. Importers gain from lower prices of manufactured goods. | MediumMexico loses part of its nearshoring advantage. Commodity exporters gain from firmer demand in both markets. | HighRussia's value to China as a partner falls. Transit and re-export trade through Central Asia is exposed. |
| S14 · Upside ↗Middle East settlementBGeopolitical and security | LowA guarantor of the framework. Shale producers face a lower oil risk premium. | MediumShorter Suez routes and lower oil and gas risk. Europe is also a donor and a source of contractors. | MediumThe largest buyer of Gulf crude gains secure supply. Its contractors compete for reconstruction work. | MediumJapan, Korea and Taiwan gain secure energy routes. ASEAN shippers regain the Suez route. | MediumGulf energy and remittances become more secure. Corridor plans to Europe revive. | HighThe parties themselves: verification, reconstruction, returns and armed resistance all fall here. | MediumRed Sea and East African ports regain traffic. Horn of Africa states face less spillover from Yemen. | LowOil exporters lose a share of the premium. Direct trade exposure is small. | LowOil exporters lose price support and arms sales. Direct exposure is limited. |
| S15 · Upside ↗Clean power thresholdCEnergy, climate and resources | HighCheap firm power meets strong demand from data centres and industry. Connection queues of five years limit the gain; shale and oil sands producers lose asset value. | HighA large importer gain and lower industrial power costs. Permitting speed and cross-border transmission decide whether heavy industry stays. | HighThe largest maker of modules, cells and grid equipment gains export orders and its fuel import bill falls. Coal provinces carry the adjustment. | HighJapan, Korea and Taiwan cut fuel import bills and ASEAN attracts industry. Australia and Indonesia lose coal and gas revenue but hold minerals and sites. | HighLower import bills and faster electrification for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Distribution company finances and grid capacity limit how much reaches users. | HighExpected hydrocarbon revenue is revised down. Low-cost producers with sovereign funds diversify into solar-powered industry; producers without buffers face early fiscal strain. | HighReliable supply becomes affordable where access is lowest. Cost of capital and weak utilities hold back delivery; Nigeria, Angola and Algeria lose revenue. | HighCopper and lithium exporters gain from materials demand and hydropower adds firm supply cheaply. Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia lose oil income. | HighBudgets rest on oil and gas, so the loss dominates. Lower expected demand raises borrowing costs and reduces the value of pipeline supply to neighbours. |
| S16 · Upside ↗Water-efficient food leapCEnergy, climate and resources | MediumA major exporter: farm-gate prices and cropland values fall in higher-cost districts, while seed and irrigation firms sell into deployment. | MediumConsumers gain modestly. High-cost cereal producers lose margin and slower approval of edited varieties limits uptake. | HighWater stress on the northern plain and strong domestic crop science make uptake fast. | HighRice importers move closer to self-sufficiency; Thailand, Vietnam and Australia lose export volume. | HighGroundwater depletion makes water per tonne the main gain. Pumping subsidies weaken the incentive to save. | HighThe most water-scarce region: import bills fall and irrigated output rises within fixed water budgets. | HighThe widest yield gap and the largest gain, limited by seed supply, rural credit and storage. | HighBrazil and Argentina lose export margin. Smallholders in Central America and the Andes gain; land concentration risk is highest. | MediumRussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan lose export income and leverage. Irrigated farming in Central Asia saves water. |
| S17 · Upside ↗Automated discovery stepDTechnology and infrastructure | HighHome to most system developers and much automated laboratory capacity. Gains and patents concentrate here first, with the dual-use control problem. | HighA deep research base and large pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Approval speed decides whether discoveries are captured or filed elsewhere. | HighLaboratory scale, state research funding and open-weight models support fast adoption. Access to advanced chips sets the pace. | HighJapan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Australia hold materials, chip and biomanufacturing capacity. Much of ASEAN and the Pacific depends on licences. | MediumContract research and generics face repricing. A large trained workforce can capture gains if automated laboratories are built. | MediumCapital and power can buy compute and laboratories. The shortage is skilled evaluators and a domestic research base. | MediumLarge potential gains in neglected diseases and crops, with few laboratories or evaluators to direct the systems at local priorities. | MediumStrong public research institutes in a few states. Regulatory capacity and funding limit capture; most nations buy products later. | MediumSkilled scientists but restricted access to chips and licensed systems. Open versions help and defence applications take priority. |
| S18 · Upside ↗Public service leapDTechnology and infrastructure | MediumFederal and state systems are fragmented and private payment networks are entrenched. The gain is real but institutional resistance is strong. | MediumMost services are already digital. The remaining gain is inclusion and interoperability across borders and agencies. | MediumPayments and services already run on platform firms and state systems. The gap is independent testing and consent. | HighSouth-East Asian states are linking instant payment systems. Archipelagos and Pacific islands gain most from remote access and depend most on the offline route. | HighIndia supplies the model and much of the open software. Neighbours with large benefit programmes have the most to gain. | MediumGulf states have capital and digital government. Elsewhere in the region conflict and weak audit limit the gain. | HighThe largest available gain, built on wide mobile money use. Identity coverage, connectivity and language coverage are the constraints. | HighBrazil's instant payment system is the regional reference. Large informal sectors raise both the tax gain and the resistance. | MediumStates can build the systems quickly. Weak independent oversight makes rights-respecting operation the condition least likely to be met. |
| S19 · Upside ↗Chronic disease advanceEHealth | HighHigh obesity and diabetes give a large health gain. Providers paid by the procedure lose revenue and resist payment reform. | HighStrong primary care in many states supports capture. Ageing populations make the pension revision large. | HighA very large diabetic and hypertensive population and domestic manufacturing. Hospital-centred care has to change as the population ages quickly. | HighJapan and Korea face the sharpest longevity pressure. South-East Asian and Pacific states have rising diabetes and uneven primary care. | HighDiabetes and heart disease strike early in working life, so the labour gain is large. The generic manufacturing base supplies other regions. | HighDiabetes prevalence is some of the highest in the world. The means to pay exist, but care is hospital-centred. | MediumThe burden is rising from a lower base in young populations. Thin primary care and diagnostics limit how much of the gain is captured. | HighHigh obesity and diabetes, notably in Mexico. Segmented health coverage decides who is reached and who is not. | HighHigh cardiovascular mortality among working-age men gives a large potential gain. Weak primary care and constrained access hold it back. |
| S20 · Upside ↗Outbreak defence succeedsEHealth | HighPlatform developers and large manufacturers supply the network. Public trust decides uptake, and the gain is smaller where consent is contested. | HighManufacturing depth and regulatory reliance across borders shorten authorisation. Ageing populations make the avoided hospital demand large. | HighA large manufacturing base and dense cities. Timely sharing of samples and data decides whether it gains inside the network or waits outside it. | HighStrong surveillance and experience of earlier outbreaks support early detection. Trade-dependent economies gain most from open borders. | HighVaccine production in India supplies several regions. Density and thin hospital capacity make the avoided surge large at home. | MediumCapital to purchase and small populations limit exposure. A mobile migrant workforce and mass gatherings are the test of delivery. | HighRegional plants supply doses on schedule, which did not happen in 2021. Vaccinators and cold chain outside main cities limit how much is delivered. | HighRegional producers in Brazil and Argentina reduce dependence on imports. Delivery through primary care and public trust set the result. | HighDomestic vaccine capability exists, but partial participation in sharing arrangements delays access and raises the cost for neighbours. |
Overview cells are summaries of each scenario's own record, written with the record in the second pass: its narrative, transmission channels, loading table and regional rationale. Bold marks the phrase to read first. Exposure is a regional judgement; nation-level results are on the results pages. Source: model-panel-v0.5. Download as CSV.
How each scenario unfolds: what signals it, what sets it off, what happens first, what follows, how it settles and what it leaves changed. Read a row from left to right. Scenarios run down the page in edition order; scroll sideways for every column.
| Scenario | Lead indicatorswhat moves first | Triggersthe event or condition that sets it off | Immediateearly developments | Post-immediatewhat follows | Stabilisationthe mature phase | Long termwhat is left changed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 · Rank 1Trade bloc ruptureAEconomic and trade | Tariffs between the United States and China pass 60 per cent in both directions. Export controls reach mature chip equipment and Chinese magnet shipments fall by more than half. | The largest trading powers impose reciprocal tariffs, export licensing and investment restrictions in sequence over six months. The truces that ended earlier escalations fail together. | Suppliers of 40 per cent of several critical inputs cannot sell across the divide. Manufacturers hold four to ten weeks of stock and short-time working begins in the eighth week. | Prices of the affected inputs double and some antibiotics are placed under allocation. Secondary restrictions reach firms and banks in neutral countries, and exemptions carry conditions on alignment. | After two years world goods trade is 10 per cent below its earlier level. The first new processing capacity reaches volume only then, and inflation stays above target. | Trade stays divided under two rule books and incompatible standards. Countries that had not mapped their dependence lose output for years, and several give up policy positions to obtain supply. |
| S02 · Rank 2Global funding seizureAEconomic and trade | US equities exceed 35 times cyclically adjusted earnings and commercial property prices fall more than 20 per cent from peak. High-yield spreads pass 800 basis points. | Large technology companies cut data-centre spending plans and lenders mark down office and data-centre loans. The repricing of technology and commercial property starts withdrawals from leveraged funds. | Within ten days private credit funds suspend redemptions and exposed banks lose a fifth of deposits in two working days. Global equities fall 40 per cent within weeks. | Cross-border private lending contracts by a quarter over two quarters and trade finance is cut. Vulnerable sovereign spreads rise 500 basis points and eight governments lose market access. | Funding markets stay impaired for nine months, until investment-grade issuance resumes. By then unemployment in advanced economies is three percentage points higher and technology investment a third lower. | Governments that guaranteed all bank liabilities spend years servicing the cost. Divided creditors slow debt restructuring and central banks are pressed to hold more government debt. |
| S03 · Rank 3Regional war spilloverBGeopolitical and security | Forces deploy, reserves are called up and three or more governments advise nationals to leave. Attacks on merchant vessels recur and war-risk premiums double within 90 days. | After months of visible tension, an exchange of strikes between a regional state and a major power becomes sustained conventional warfare within a week. Partner states join within days. | War-risk underwriters withdraw cover on the third day and transits fall 70 per cent. Importing states release emergency stocks in the second week and governments begin evacuating nationals. | During the 90-day closure oil reaches twice and gas four times its pre-war price. Fuel is allocated to industry, fertiliser and freight costs rise and central banks tighten. | A ceasefire holds after six months of war. Traffic recovers only in part over the following six months while mines are cleared and insurers and crews return. | Export terminals and emergency stocks take years to restore, at higher prices. Munitions stocks remain below pre-war levels in every state that fought or supplied. |
| S06 · Rank 4Breadbasket failureCEnergy, climate and resources | Poor crop conditions in two exporting regions in one season, exporters' stocks-to-use ratios at ten-year lows and an El Niño or La Niña advisory during both growing seasons. | Extreme heat and drought cut exportable grain from two major producing regions by 25 per cent in the same season, measured against the five-year average. | Within months international staple prices double. Other exporters restrict sales, some with normal harvests, and contracted cargoes are delayed, re-priced or cancelled. | Delivered imports fall 15 per cent below requirement for exposed buyers. Subsidy bills double, reserves drain, rationing begins and unrest follows where distribution is seen as unfair. | Lower fertiliser use carries the shortage into a second harvest. Prices stay doubled for 18 months, then fall within months once harvests recover; rebuilding reserves keeps import demand high. | Child malnutrition leaves lasting losses in health and schooling. Herds, small farms and public reserves take years to rebuild; degraded soils and depleted aquifers slow the recovery. |
| S08 · Rank 5AI labour shockDTechnology and infrastructure | Entry-level job postings down 30 per cent on 2024 for two quarters, agent task horizons above one working week and fewer workers aged 22 to 25 in exposed occupations. | Within months, agent reliability and cost pass the point at which firms can assign whole administrative and professional workflows, not single tasks. | Recruitment falls before headcount. Employers in exposed occupations halve graduate and trainee intakes in the first recruitment cycle. | Redundancies follow as firms redesign processes around agents. Clients withdraw outsourcing contracts and business services export receipts fall 20 per cent over three years in exporting economies. | In exposed economies one job in ten is removed or redesigned by year three; a third of displaced workers regain comparable pay. Employment-linked receipts run 10 per cent below plan. | The jobs do not return. Entry routes into skilled work narrow as supervised junior work stays scarce, and fewer young adults expect to be better off than their parents. |
| S04 · Rank 6Hybrid coercionBGeopolitical and security | Unexplained subsea cable faults recur in one sea basin and satellite positioning interference exceeds ten days a month. An advisory names state access in the nation's energy or telecommunications operators. | Late in a 12-month deniable campaign of sabotage, intrusion and interference, the hostile state activates concealed access to grid and telecommunications control systems. | Areas producing half of national output lose power and communications for 72 hours. Mobile networks last about four hours on batteries, card payments stop and engineers switch substations by hand. | Electricity is rationed for 30 days and industry works three days a week. Attribution is contested, repair crews are threatened and the adversary offers restraint for a concession. | Services are restored within months. Allies consult and send grid engineers and mobile generation, but agree no collective measure. | Insurers exclude state-backed sabotage from infrastructure cover and foreign manufacturers defer planned plants. Deterrence weakens where the campaign is seen to have gone unanswered. |
| S10 · Rank 7Severe pandemicEHealth | Clusters of human cases with no recorded animal contact, following avian or swine influenza in mammals, then sustained human-to-human transmission reported in two or more WHO regions. | A novel respiratory pathogen spreads internationally before reliable detection, so containment at the border fails. Its infection fatality ratio is 0.5 per cent. | Hospitals in the first affected cities reach the limit of staffed beds in week six. Producer governments restrict exports of protective equipment, medicines and vaccine inputs within two months. | Hospital demand peaks at twice staffed capacity and ordinary care is suspended. Workplace absence reaches 15 per cent, schools close for four months and governments borrow to support incomes. | Vaccines arrive at scale from month nine, later for nations without manufacturing or purchase agreements. Further waves follow in the second year and most capability returns within years. | Losses persist in learning, treatment backlogs and long-term illness. Public debt is higher and trust is lower where guidance changed without explanation. |
| S05 · Rank 8Legitimacy ruptureBGeopolitical and security | Trust in national government is below 30 per cent with a vote due within 12 months. Observers decline to confirm the count and the sovereign spread widens 200 basis points. | A disputed election, succession or constitutional ruling leaves two claimants, each citing a lawful basis. Fabricated evidence spreads faster than its correction. | Within weeks protests recur in the capital and provincial cities. Election officials and judges receive coordinated threats and police commanders decline orders in contested provinces. | Normal administration stops for 20 per cent of the population. Revenue runs 15 per cent below plan, public salaries are paid late and the currency falls 18 per cent. | A mediated agreement after six months sets a rerun, whose result the losing side accepts within the year. Output that year is 5 per cent below its previous path. | Emergency provisions on public assembly remain in ordinary law. Fewer than a third of respondents trust the electoral commission to run the next election. |
| S07 · Rank 9Core disasterCEnergy, climate and resources | Forecast river flow above the 20-year return level in the core basin, El Niño or La Niña declared for the coming season and an insured share below 40 per cent. | A flood, storm, fire, heat emergency or earthquake strikes the principal economic concentration. Warning is days at most, and none for the earthquake variant. | A tenth of the population is affected. Transport, water and health assets run below half capacity for 30 days, and power and telecommunications outages slow the response. | Firms in the core stop work and suppliers elsewhere lose inputs. Insurance pays less than half of damage worth 8 per cent of GDP; the budget borrows at wider spreads. | Reconstruction takes two years. Displacement, interrupted schooling and deferred health care persist throughout, and an inquiry assigns responsibility for weaknesses known beforehand. | Some firms and residents do not return and lost trade is not fully regained. Insurers reprice or withdraw cover in the affected districts and mortgage lending there slows. |
| S09 · Rank 10Cryptographic trust breakDTechnology and infrastructure | Resource estimates for breaking 2048-bit RSA under 100,000 physical qubits, demonstrations of 100 logical qubits sustaining deep circuits and advisories of large-scale collection of encrypted traffic. | A state demonstrates a quantum attack on RSA and elliptic-curve keys by releasing decrypted intercepts and forging selected signatures. There is no warning of the date. | Root, code-signing and interbank keys are treated as compromised. Governments and financial operators revoke vulnerable credentials within 30 days and suspend remote signing and some cross-border payments. | Cross-border services run under manual confirmation and value limits for 90 days. Stored intercepts become readable, selective disclosure begins and courts rule on documents signed with broken algorithms. | Emergency migration takes 12 months, paced by devices that cannot be updated remotely and by scarce engineers. Nations with cryptographic inventories finish urgent work in about four months. | Fifteen years of archived traffic must be assumed exposed, which cannot be reversed. Long-lived devices and many registries in lower-income countries remain on the broken algorithms. |
| S11 · Upside ↗Debt service resetAEconomic and trade | Debt service exceeds 20 per cent of revenue in 25 or more states. Two consecutive restructurings close in under 12 months and all three creditor groups endorse a term sheet. | Official bilateral creditors, Chinese state lenders and the largest bondholders adopt one common framework. Statutes in New York and London already limit what holdout creditors can recover. | At least 25 states conclude agreements within 18 months, under a payment standstill. Rating agencies move each to selective default at signing and creditors record present-value losses. | Debt service falls 40 per cent and concessional loans fund published investment plans. Outcomes diverge: some states execute investment, others fund wages, subsidies and arrears. Non-participants pay higher spreads. | Reduced payments hold for five years. Most participants are upgraded, spreads on outside borrowers ease after about a year and states that stayed current contest the terms. | After the fifth year debt service rises again. States that raised revenue and output regain market access on better terms; the others return to distress. |
| S12 · Upside ↗Market access openingAEconomic and trade | A compact whose signatories exceed a quarter of world output reaches its ratification threshold. Announced greenfield investment into prospective members rises 15 per cent above its three-year average. | The compact enters into force within one year of signature among economies holding about a third of world output. Nine tariff lines in ten go to zero or begin reduction. | Over the first year one rule of origin and mutual recognition of qualifications, digital rules and traceability take effect. Firms redirect investment to members that can qualify suppliers. | Ports, power and standards bodies in recipient members reach capacity; investment moves on. Protected incumbents lose market share within two years; tariff revenue falls and skilled staff leave poorer members. | After three years member trade is 20 per cent above its prior path and productive investment 30 per cent. Closely competing non-members record about a tenth less foreign investment. | The change is structural: new corridors and supplier bases stay in place. Non-members apply to join and accession conditions extend the compact's rules to economies outside it. |
| S13 · Upside ↗Great-power détenteBGeopolitical and security | Liberalising trade measures exceed restricting ones and export control lists record net removals for two consecutive quarters. Military activity around Taiwan falls over six months. | A near-collision between naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait is contained and opens fourteen months of talks. The agreement enters into force, with sovereignty claims unchanged. | Tariffs are removed in four stages over 18 months and selected technology controls move to a published list. War-risk loadings and Pacific container rates fall. | Trade worth at least 1 per cent of global GDP reopens. Protected plants report losses within two quarters and diversion economies lose orders; some governments extend subsidies. | Over three years to the first review, a joint commission publishes compliance data and settles disputes within 90 days. Allies hold defence spending flat; protected producers adjust over years. | Competition continues under clearer rules, but either party can withdraw on six months' notice. Reversal risk stays in investment and defence planning; capacity built on diverted trade remains. |
| S14 · Upside ↗Middle East settlementBGeopolitical and security | Ceasefire violations fall for three consecutive months in each theatre, two consecutive inspection reports confirm access and war-risk premiums on Gulf and Red Sea voyages start to fall. | After fourteen months of talks, regional governments and four external guarantors sign a security framework covering shipping guarantees, monitored ceasefires and staged sanctions relief. Borders and recognition stay unsettled. | Attacks on merchant vessels stop and container lines return to the Red Sea in the fourth month. Within 12 months transits near normal and war-risk insurance costs halve. | Inspection reports release sanctions relief in stages. Reconstruction commitments reach 10 per cent of conflict-affected participants' combined annual GDP but disbursement runs behind, and armed groups attack reconstruction sites. | About 40 per cent of displaced residents return within three years, staying where services are restored. Governments that deliver inspections and services attract private investment; others keep only the ceasefire. | Importers keep cheaper energy and shorter routes; arms suppliers and Cape-route operators lose the conflict premium. Borders, recognition and accountability stay unresolved, and a suspended relief stage could reverse it. |
| S15 · Upside ↗Clean power thresholdCEnergy, climate and resources | Enhanced geothermal and advanced fission plants complete two years of commercial operation at contracted availability. Firm clean supply reaches 60 per cent of new gas plant cost in three markets. | Independent audits of eleven plants in five climate zones confirm 99.9 per cent reliability at 40 per cent below the cost of new fossil plant. Designs and data are public. | Lenders treat the design as proven within months and standard projects reach financial close within 18 months. Orders for transformers, cable, rigs and minerals exceed supply and prices rise. | Expected hydrocarbon demand ten years ahead is revised down 20 per cent and reserves are written down before volumes fall. Exporters' borrowing costs rise; connection queues delay financed projects. | Within five years industrial electricity costs are 30 per cent lower in early adopters, where projects connect in three years. Energy-intensive industry and data centres relocate; households gain later. | The change is structural. Importers keep a lasting terms-of-trade gain and industry stays where power connected fastest; exporters without buffers must replace a revenue base and coal regions lose employment. |
| S16 · Upside ↗Water-efficient food leapCEnergy, climate and resources | The same variety is registered in five or more countries within a year. Cereal yields in low-yield regions rise more than 5 per cent a year for two seasons. | Trials at 140 sites in 22 countries validate the package. Thirty-one governments, seed licensors and lenders then sign three linked agreements on approval, trait fees and finance. | Seed multiplication is the first constraint. In the first season certified seed covers under a tenth of the target area and several governments ration it by district. | By the fourth season the package covers 40 per cent of staple area. Adopting farms raise output 25 per cent and international staple prices fall 15 per cent. | Importers' food bills and inflation fall; high-cost exporters lose farm income and cropland value. Regulators set basin limits after expanded irrigation keeps total withdrawals from falling. | Staple trade reorders around importers closer to self-sufficiency. The gain stays where the package reached: stunting falls in adopting districts, and farmers without credit, seed or tenure fall behind. |
| S17 · Upside ↗Automated discovery stepDTechnology and infrastructure | Independent laboratories reproduce AI-directed discoveries. The length of tasks AI agents complete keeps rising and the first AI-designed medicine gains full regulatory approval. | Eleven laboratories in seven countries, none funded by the developers, reproduce the whole research loop in three fields: therapeutic candidates, battery and catalyst materials and engineered enzymes. | Licences are on sale within months and open versions follow within the year. Access spreads faster than the automated laboratories needed to test what the systems propose. | Qualifying programmes halve time and cost per validated candidate over three years. Contract research firms lose a third of their orders and early-stage pipelines are written down. | Regulators and patent offices become the limiting step. Prepared agencies clear candidates into trials a year ahead and receive first filings. Trials take as long as before. | Five jurisdictions hold most new patents and research staff move to equipped sites. Nations with licences but no laboratories buy products later, at the owners' prices. |
| S18 · Upside ↗Public service leapDTechnology and infrastructure | Digital identity covers above 90 per cent of adults and digital payments above 80 per cent. A data protection law with an independent regulator is in force. | The audit office publishes independent security and inclusion tests, a legal condition of the switch. The government then moves its principal payments and administrative services to public systems. | Benefits, public salaries, taxes and licences move to the new route within months. Assisted counters handle 11 per cent of transactions in the first year. | Median benefit delivery falls from 20 days to four. About 60,000 agents lose most of their fee income and resist through courts and stoppages; officials delay record transfers. | Within two years 90 per cent of adults use the services and the tax compliance gap narrows by a quarter. A third year of contested operation follows. | Procurement and service decisions leave auditable records; gatekeepers lose discretion. The gain is reversible: it holds while the offline route stays staffed and the regulator can refuse the state. |
| S19 · Upside ↗Chronic disease advanceEHealth | Two independent trials report major events cut by 25 per cent or more. Non-exclusive licences cover more than 100 countries and generic prices fall below US$10 a month. | Two trials following 64,000 adults in 29 countries show 30 per cent fewer heart attacks, strokes, cases of kidney failure and amputations among biomarker-selected patients on a low-cost combination. | Rights holders agree non-exclusive licences covering 140 countries within months. Within two years regional manufacturers supply the combination at under US$6 a month. | Systems with patient registers and funded primary care start eligible adults on treatment within months. Elsewhere uptake follows the ability to pay and gaps within nations widen. | Over five years adopting systems cut avoidable admissions by 15 per cent and working-age participation rises. Dialysis operators and cardiac surgery centres close capacity; hospital savings arrive slowly. | Revised mortality tables add about a year to projected life expectancy at 60. Pension deficits grow, governments legislate on pension age and outcome gaps between nations measure government performance. |
| S20 · Upside ↗Outbreak defence succeedsEHealth | Sequences of novel pathogens are shared in under 14 days. Commercial-scale vaccine manufacturing exists on every continent and the pandemic agreement reaches 60 ratifications. | A novel respiratory pathogen emerges naturally. Its genome is shared four days after the first reported cluster, which activates the pre-agreed international response. | Validated diagnostics reach participating nations within 30 days and trial networks enrol in week three. The first vaccine authorisation is granted on day 96; manufacturing has started at risk. | Within six months regional plants supply priority-group doses on every continent. Hospital demand peaks at 80 per cent of surge capacity and no participant orders a general lockdown. | The outbreak is contained within a year; forecast output loss falls below half of one per cent. States outside the network receive doses four to six months later. | Reviews find that consent and public trust decided outcomes as much as supply. Scarcity-dependent suppliers lose pricing power and the standing capacity needs continued financing once the outbreak ends. |
Overview cells are summaries of each scenario's own record, written with the record in the second pass: its narrative, transmission channels, loading table and regional rationale. Bold marks the phrase to read first. The six stages follow each scenario on its own clock: the immediate stage is hours and days for a sudden shock and the first months for a slow one. Cells are written from the scenario's own indicators, narrative, transmission channels and recovery horizon. Source: model-panel-v0.5. Download as CSV.
Scenarios 2027. A stable, versioned library of severe but plausible shocks, specified on a common grammar, rated for likelihood and impact and mapped to the capabilities each one stresses. Two readings: how the scenarios rank on likelihood and impact, here, and what each one does to each nation, on the Simulations page.
Likelihood and impact
Each scenario is rated at Standard Severe. Likelihood is global; impact is shown on the systemic scale or for a typical highly exposed nation. Bands carry their probability ranges; hover or focus a scenario for its scorecard. Use the horizon and impact toggles to change the axes, and the filters to narrow the set.
| Systemic impact ↑ | 1 Remoteunder 0.2 per cent | 2 Unlikely0.2 to 1 per cent | 3 Possible1 to 5 per cent | 4 Likely5 to 25 per cent | 5 Highly likelyover 25 per cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5Catastrophic | |||||
| 4Severe | |||||
| 3Significant | |||||
| 2Moderate | |||||
| 1Limited |
Likelihood, two years (to end-2028) →
- AEconomic and trade
- BGeopolitical and security
- CEnergy, climate and resources
- DTechnology and infrastructure
- EHealth
- AHollow badge: in Library, not ranked in 2027
- ↗ Upside scenario
The ranked ten
Provisional ranking by priority score with the published tie-break rules: systemic impact, then confidence, then ten-year likelihood. This is the development default; the panel's results replace it before release. Priority is L2y × max(systemic impact, national impact); this arithmetic exists for development and transparency; it does not bind the Edition.
Rank | Scenario | Family | L2y | L10y | Sys | Nat | Confidence | Priority | Movement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Trade bloc rupture S01 | AEconomic and trade | 3Possible | 4Likely | 4Severe | 4Severe | medium | 12 Tier II | new |
| 2 | Global funding seizure S02 | AEconomic and trade | 3Possible | 4Likely | 4Severe | 4Severe | medium | 12 Tier II | new |
| 3 | Regional war spillover S03 | BGeopolitical and security | 3Possible | 4Likely | 4Severe | 4Severe | medium | 12 Tier II | new |
| 4 | Breadbasket failure S06 | CEnergy, climate and resources | 3Possible | 4Likely | 3Significant | 4Severe | medium | 12 Tier II | new |
| 5 | AI labour shock S08 | DTechnology and infrastructure | 3Possible | 4Likely | 3Significant | 4Severe | low | 12 Tier II | new |
| 6 | Hybrid coercion S04 | BGeopolitical and security | 3Possible | 4Likely | 2Moderate | 4Severe | medium | 12 Tier II | new |
| 7 | Severe pandemic S10 | EHealth | 2Unlikely | 3Possible | 4Severe | 4Severe | medium | 8 Tier III | new |
| 8 | Legitimacy rupture S05 | BGeopolitical and security | 2Unlikely | 3Possible | 1Limited | 4Severe | medium | 8 Tier III | new |
| 9 | Core disaster S07 | CEnergy, climate and resources | 2Unlikely | 3Possible | 1Limited | 4Severe | medium | 8 Tier III | new |
| 10 | Cryptographic trust break S09 | DTechnology and infrastructure | 1Remote | 3Possible | 3Significant | 4Severe | low | 4 Tier III | new |
- JudgementS01 and S02 tie on priority, systemic impact, confidence and ten-year likelihood; they are placed in Library order.
- JudgementS02 and S03 tie on priority, systemic impact, confidence and ten-year likelihood; they are placed in Library order.
- JudgementS05 and S07 tie on priority, systemic impact, confidence and ten-year likelihood; they are placed in Library order.
- JudgementThe ten upside scenarios are rated on the same scales but not ranked: the ranked ten order downside risk, and a priority score would read a large gain as a large threat.
- JudgementThe second pass holds ten downside scenarios, so the ranked ten are the whole downside set. The ranking orders them; it no longer selects among them.
Headline findings
- 1Placeholder
- No scenario reaches Tier I in the second pass. The panel rated two-year likelihood lower than the first-pass desk scores did, and six of the ten downside scenarios tie at a priority of 12.
- 2Placeholder
- The scenarios that strike one nation at a time (hybrid coercion, legitimacy rupture and a disaster in the core) carry a national impact of 4 against a systemic impact of 1 or 2, and do not appear in global risk rankings.
- 3Placeholder
- The one wholly new downside scenario, a break in cryptographic trust, is the least likely of the ten and the only one that leaves physical networks running while digital trust fails.
Upside scenarios
Not every shock is a loss. A shock most would count as progress. It is not upside for everyone: each record names who gains and who loses. Impact levels measure the scale of change, in either direction, and loads mark the capabilities a nation needs in order to capture the gain or absorb the loss. They sit in the Library on the same grammar and are not ranked.
- AEconomic and trade
GainsAt least 25 debt-distressed states that conclude agreements
LosesBondholders and official bilateral creditors, who accept losses
- Two-year likelihood band 2 · ten-year band 3 · confidence medium
- AEconomic and trade
GainsCompetitive exporters in member states that qualify suppliers quickly
LosesProtected incumbent producers inside the compact
- Two-year likelihood band 3 · ten-year band 4 · confidence medium
- BGeopolitical and security
GainsTrade-dependent economies with competitive exporters selling to both markets
LosesProducers financed on tariff protection or on subsidy premised on continued restrictions
- Two-year likelihood band 1 · ten-year band 3 · confidence low
- BGeopolitical and security
GainsCivilians in conflict-affected states, through security, restored services and reconstruction
LosesArmed groups and intermediaries that earned income from checkpoints, smuggling and protection
- Two-year likelihood band 2 · ten-year band 3 · confidence low
- CEnergy, climate and resources
GainsEnergy importers with grid capacity: much of Europe, Japan, Korea, India and China
LosesHydrocarbon-dependent states without fiscal buffers or sovereign funds
- Two-year likelihood band 3 · ten-year band 4 · confidence medium
- CEnergy, climate and resources
GainsSmallholders in low-yield regions who obtain seed, credit and advice
LosesHigh-cost grain exporters and their farmers
- Two-year likelihood band 3 · ten-year band 4 · confidence medium
- DTechnology and infrastructure
GainsNations with automated laboratories, compute, skilled evaluators and capable regulators
LosesContract research and screening businesses that sell long development cycles
- Two-year likelihood band 3 · ten-year band 4 · confidence low
- DTechnology and infrastructure
GainsHouseholds that receive benefits, pensions and refunds in days instead of weeks
LosesAgents, brokers and payment handlers whose fee income depended on the old process
- Two-year likelihood band 2 · ten-year band 3 · confidence medium
- EHealth
GainsPeople with or at high risk of cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes and kidney disease
LosesHospitals and specialist providers paid by the admission or procedure for preventable complications
- Two-year likelihood band 3 · ten-year band 4 · confidence low
- EHealth
GainsPopulations of nations inside the surveillance and supply network
LosesStates outside the sharing and allocation network, which lose relative security
- Two-year likelihood band 2 · ten-year band 3 · confidence low
In the Library, not ranked in 2027
The Library is the stable set of scenarios; the Edition ranks ten of them each year. Rankings move; scenarios persist. Browse all scenarios.
Read the edition by audience or region
Citation and versions
Cite as
GINC (2027). Scenarios 2027: Scenario Library v0.5 Oxford: Global Institute for National Capability. scenarios.ginc.org/scenarios
Content and data are published under CC BY 4.0.