Likelihood, two years: 3Possible; to end-2028
Likelihood, ten years: 4Likely; to end-2036
Systemic impact: 3Significant; global
National impact: 4Major; typical highly exposed nation
Onset pace: Months
Duration (acute phase): 3 years
Warning time: Months
Scope: Global
Recovery horizon: Structural
Capability load: Hard 1/3Soft 2/3Economic 1/3; domains loaded High
Concurrency: Standalone; triggers 3 · triggered by 5
Confidence · movement: medium; new

Rated at Standard Severe. Event reach: global event. Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Upside scenario: impact levels measure the scale of change, not loss.

Capture test: results by nation

03Narrative

Dateline: March 2032

The compact was signed in February 2028 by 31 governments on four continents and entered into force on 1 January 2029, once the minimum number of ratifications had been deposited. Its members accounted for about a third of world output. On the first day, nine tariff lines in ten among them went to zero or began a five-year reduction. The clauses that mattered more took effect over the following year: one rule of origin that let inputs from any member count towards qualifying content; mutual recognition of engineering, nursing and accounting qualifications; common rules on data transfers and electronic documents; and acceptance of each other's product traceability records.

Firms responded before governments did. Within eighteen months, announced factory, logistics and data-centre investment into members ran 30 per cent above its earlier path, and most of it went to a small number of places. A textile and electronics corridor formed between South Asian ports and East African processing zones. Vehicle component makers moved lines from non-member suppliers to member states in South-East Asia and Latin America so that finished vehicles would qualify. By the end of 2031, trade among members was 20 per cent higher than the projection made before the compact.

The gains followed capability, not membership alone. Members whose standards laboratories were accredited and whose customs systems accepted electronic certificates saw suppliers qualify within months. In others, exporters waited more than a year for test results that buyers would accept, and investment committed to them was reassigned to neighbours. Ports that could not add berths turned vessels away. Two members rationed industrial power connections. Training colleges in the faster-growing corridors could not supply enough technicians, and recognised qualifications allowed nurses and engineers to leave poorer members for richer ones.

There were losses inside the compact as well. Protected producers of steel, sugar and vehicles in several members lost market share within two years, and three governments used the safeguard clause. Tariff revenue fell in members that had relied on it and two revised their budgets during the year. Capital inflows raised exchange rates in the main recipient economies and made their other exports less competitive.

Non-members did not share in the gains by default. Economies that competed directly with new members for assembly work recorded foreign investment about a tenth below earlier levels, and their exporters faced tariffs that their rivals no longer paid. Six applied to join in 2031. The list of applicants, and the conditions set for them, became the compact's main source of influence over economies outside it.

The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.

04Summary

Large emerging and advanced economies, together about a third of world output, bring a trade and investment compact into force within one year of signature. It removes most tariffs among members and mutually recognises selected services qualifications, digital trade rules and product traceability systems. Over three years member trade rises 20 per cent and productive foreign investment into members 30 per cent, both relative to the prior path. New corridors become commercially viable. Nations must qualify suppliers, expand infrastructure and mobilise workers quickly. Protected incumbents inside the compact lose market share, and non-members face investment diversion and not an automatic share of the gains.

Who gains: Competitive exporters in member states that qualify suppliers quickly
Young workers and holders of recognised qualifications in connected labour markets
Members with spare port, power and industrial land capacity
Logistics, standards and digital trade service providers along the new corridors
Consumers in member states, through lower prices for traded goods
Who loses: Protected incumbent producers inside the compact
Non-members that compete directly with members for investment
Poorer members that lose nurses and engineers to richer partners
Governments that relied on tariff revenue

A shock most would count as progress. It is not upside for everyone: each record names who gains and who loses. Impact levels measure the scale of change, in either direction, and loads mark the capabilities a nation needs in order to capture the gain or absorb the loss.

05Historical anchors

Event	Date	What happened	Calibrates
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership	1 January 2022	Signed in November 2020, the agreement entered into force on 1 January 2022 for ten of its 15 signatories, which together account for about 30 per cent of world output. A single rule of origin lets inputs from any member count towards qualifying content	the scale of membership assumed here and the time from signature to entry into force; the rule of origin as the clause that moves supply chains
African Continental Free Trade Area	1 January 2021	Trading began under an agreement signed by 54 states, but tariff schedules and rules of origin were incomplete. A Guided Trade Initiative began in October 2022 with eight countries. The World Bank estimated income gains of 7 per cent, about US$450 billion, by 2035, most of it from trade facilitation	the gap between entry into force and usable market access; why customs and standards capacity carry the High loads
North American Free Trade Agreement	1 January 1994	The agreement joined an emerging economy to two advanced ones. Mexico's goods exports to the United States more than tripled within a decade and assembly investment concentrated in its northern states. A currency crisis followed in December 1994	national impact for an emerging member; uneven gains within a member; the macro-financial channel
European Union enlargement of 2004	1 May 2004	Ten states with about 75 million people joined the single market, with recognition of professional qualifications. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden opened their labour markets at once; other members phased access over up to seven years	investment into new members, and the movement of skilled workers from poorer to richer members once qualifications are recognised
China after WTO accession	2001–2010	Growth averaged about 10 per cent a year and goods exports grew more than fivefold	the upper bound on the response to secure market access; the effect on incumbent producers elsewhere
Supply-chain diversification	2018–2025	Assembly and component production moved from China towards Vietnam, Mexico, India and Indonesia after tariffs and the pandemic. Mexico became the largest source of United States goods imports in 2023	how quickly productive investment relocates when relative market access changes; the diversion faced by locations outside the preferred set

06Parameters

Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.

Common variables at Standard Severe · read-only

1. Severity: major
severe (Standard Severe)
extreme
2. Duration (acute phase): 30 days
90 days
1 year
3 years (Standard Severe)
5 years
3. Onset pace: days
weeks
months (Standard Severe)
years
4. Warning time: none
days
months (Standard Severe)
5. Scope: national
regional
global (Standard Severe)
6. Origin: natural
accidental
adversarial (great power / neighbour / non-state)
negotiated (Standard Severe)
7. External support: full
partial (Standard Severe)
none
8. Concurrency: standalone (Standard Severe)
plus one named scenario
plus two
9. Policy response assumed: none (pure exposure)
current plans executed (Standard Severe)
best practice
10. Recovery horizon: months
years
structural (Standard Severe)

Scenario-specific parameters · read-only

Parameter	Default	Range or options	Note
Members' share of world output	33 per cent	25 to 50	Not fixed by the panel specification; set so that the systemic impact reaches level 3
Time from signature to entry into force	12 months	6 to 24	Longer at Standard Major
Rise in trade among members over three years	20 per cent	10 to 35	Relative to the path projected before the compact
Rise in productive foreign investment into members over three years	30 per cent	15 to 50	Greenfield and expansion investment; excludes mergers and portfolio flows
Share of tariff lines liberalised among members	90 per cent	80 to 97	Immediate removal or a phased reduction over five years
Scope of mutual recognition	selected services qualifications, digital trade rules and product traceability systems	options: tariffs only / full regulatory recognition	Tariffs only at Standard Major
Fall in foreign investment into closely competing non-members	10 per cent	5 to 20	A GINC assumption; the specification states diversion without a figure

07Transmission channels

1
Ratifications reach the threshold and the compact enters into force within a year of signature, removing most tariffs among members.
2
A single rule of origin and mutual recognition of qualifications, digital trade rules and traceability systems lower the cost of trading and producing across members.
3
Firms redirect productive investment to member locations that can qualify suppliers, and new trade corridors become commercially viable.
4
Ports, power, industrial land and standards bodies in recipient members reach capacity; investment moves on to members that can connect it.
5
Demand for technicians and recognised professionals rises; young workers enter formal jobs and skilled staff move from poorer to richer members.
6
Protected incumbents inside the compact lose market share, tariff revenue falls and governments face safeguard requests and adjustment costs.
7
Non-members lose investment and market share to members and apply to join; accession conditions extend the compact's rules.

08Capability loading

High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.

Domain	Load	Channel
Hard
Defence and security	Low	customs and border agencies handle higher volumes; little direct call on defence capability
Strategic infrastructure	High	ports, power, roads and industrial land limit how much redirected investment a member can take
Critical technology	Medium	traceability systems and digital trade rules; technology absorbed through supplier links
Soft
Government effectiveness	High	customs, standards bodies, permitting and recognition of qualifications must work at the pace of the compact
Human capital	High	technical skills, recognised qualifications and the movement of young workers into formal jobs
Influence and cohesion	Medium	negotiating weight among members; adjustment costs in protected sectors test consent
Economic
Macro-financial	Medium	capital inflows, exchange-rate pressure and lost tariff revenue need managing
Industry, trade and supply	High	supplier qualification, rules of origin and export capacity decide who captures the new corridors
Energy and resources	Medium	new plants raise industrial power demand; resource exporters gain processing investment

09Stakeholders

Government: Exposure
Whether the nation captures redirected investment depends on customs, standards bodies, infrastructure and skills being ready when the compact enters into force. Non-members face diversion.
Actions
Accredit standards laboratories and accept electronic certificates before entry into force
Add port, power and industrial land capacity on the corridors that become viable
Fund adjustment for protected sectors and replace lost tariff revenue
Watch
Ratification count and the date of entry into force
Supplier qualification times and use of tariff preferences
Tariff revenue and requests for safeguard measures
Technology: Exposure
Digital trade rules and traceability requirements create demand for interoperable systems. Firms outside the recognised systems lose access.
Actions
Build traceability and electronic documentation to the standards the compact recognises
Locate data and service operations where the digital trade rules apply
Train and certify technicians alongside new plants
Watch
Adoption of electronic certificates of origin
Data transfer rules among members
Technician vacancy rates in corridor economies
Investors: Exposure
Productive investment is redirected towards qualifying members, with currency pressure in recipient economies and lower returns on protected incumbents and bypassed non-members.
Actions
Assess members on infrastructure and administrative capacity, not on membership alone
Test holdings in protected sectors for loss of market share
Reassess assets in non-members that compete with member locations
Watch
Greenfield investment announcements by destination
Real exchange rates in the main recipient economies
Accession applications and safeguard actions
Public: Exposure
More formal jobs and lower prices where investment arrives; job losses in protected sectors and the departure of nurses and engineers from poorer members.
Actions
Obtain qualifications that the compact recognises
Use retraining and adjustment support where protected sectors contract
Hold local authorities to account for housing and services in growing corridor cities
Watch
Formal job creation among young workers
Emigration of health and engineering staff
Consumer prices for traded goods

10Regional exposure

Region	Exposure	Rationale
North America	Medium	Mexico is a candidate member and gains assembly; protected producers in the larger economies face member competition
Europe	Medium	Machinery and services exporters gain access; protected farm and vehicle producers lose share
China	Medium	Chinese firms invest in member states to qualify under the rule of origin; some assembly moves to member neighbours
Indo-Pacific	High	South-East Asian members take redirected component and electronics investment; advanced members supply capital and services
South Asia	High	Large young workforces and port corridors to East Africa; standards and customs capacity decide the gain
Gulf and Middle East	Medium	Supplier of capital, energy and transhipment to the new corridors
Africa	High	Processing zones and young workforces gain where suppliers qualify; the widest gap between members and bypassed neighbours
Latin America and Caribbean	High	Component, food-processing and services investment for members; closely competing non-members lose investment
Russia and Eurasia	Low	Largely outside the compact; little new investment and some loss of transit trade

11Early-warning indicators

Indicator	Source	Threshold
Regional trade agreements signed, ratified and notified as in force	WTO Regional Trade Agreements Database	A compact whose signatories exceed a quarter of world output reaches its ratification threshold
Trade-restricting and trade-facilitating measures by large economies	WTO Trade Monitoring Report	—
Greenfield foreign investment announcements by destination	UNCTAD World Investment Report	Announced investment into prospective members rises 15 per cent above its three-year average
Restrictions on services trade and recognition of foreign qualifications	OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index	—
Customs, logistics and border performance in prospective members	World Bank Logistics Performance Index	—
Applied tariffs among prospective members	WTO, ITC and UNCTAD World Tariff Profiles	—
Young people not in employment, education or training	ILO ILOSTAT	—

12Compounds

Triggers: S18 Public service leap · Digital trade and traceability rules push members to adopt interoperable public digital systems
S01 Trade bloc rupture · Excluded powers may answer a compact they read as a bloc with restrictions of their own
S15 Clean power threshold · New industrial load and lower tariffs on equipment bring standardised clean power projects forward
Triggered by: S13 Great-power détente · Lower barriers between the two largest economies make a broad compact politically possible
S01 Trade bloc rupture · Economies outside the rival blocs open to each other in response
S11 Debt service reset · Restored fiscal room lets members fund infrastructure and absorb lost tariff revenue
S14 Middle East settlement · Reliable shipping access makes cross-regional corridors viable
S16 Water-efficient food leap · Mutual recognition of seed approvals and new farm export corridors give members a working model for wider market access.
A sustained rise in tariffs by a large importer that leads other economies to open to each other
Amplified by: S15 Clean power threshold · Cheaper firm power lowers production costs at new member sites
S16 Water-efficient food leap · Higher farm output gives agricultural members more to export
Amplifying trends: Regional trade agreement deepeningTrade corridor competitionForeign investment slowdown & selectivityDigital & services trade growthNon-tariff compliance & traceabilityShifting economic weightAfrica's demographic & economic riseTechnical & occupational skill shortages
Key trends: Regional trade agreement deepeningVery high Digital & services trade growthVery high
From GINC Trends: the trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario, of 250. All S12 trend scores.

13Rating rationale

Rating	Band or level	Why
Likelihood, two years	3Possible	Large compacts already operate: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership entered into force in 2022 and the CPTPP admitted the United Kingdom in December 2024. Tariff increases by large importers since 2025 have given other economies a reason to open to each other. A Standard Severe event needs more: advanced and emerging members together, mutual recognition beyond tariffs and entry into force within a year. Few agreements of this breadth have been ratified that quickly.
Likelihood, ten years	4Likely	Over ten years the conditions accumulate. Regional agreements have deepened steadily, services and digital trade are growing faster than goods trade and traceability requirements push partners towards mutual recognition. Existing agreements could be linked or enlarged to meet the definition without a negotiation from the start. The main obstacle is domestic consent in protected sectors, which has halted comparable agreements before.
Systemic impact	3Significant	Level 3 as a gain. With members at about a third of world output, a 20 per cent rise in member trade and a 30 per cent rise in productive investment imply a change of 1 to 2.5 per cent of global output over five years. World Bank modelling of the African Continental Free Trade Area put income gains at 7 per cent by 2035, most of it from trade facilitation and not from tariff removal.
National impact	4Major	Level 4. For a member that qualifies suppliers and connects new plants, the compact brings a step change in investment, formal employment and export capacity; Mexico's goods exports to the United States more than tripled in the decade after 1994. For a closely competing non-member, or a member whose protected sectors cannot adjust, the loss of investment and market share is lasting. The highest dimension reached is economic.
Confidence	medium	The effects of past agreements are well measured. The speed assumed here and the scale of investment diversion from non-members have fewer precedents.

Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the scenario methodology page.

14Open questions

Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.

The specification does not name the members. The regional exposures assume membership concentrated in the Indo-Pacific, South Asia, Africa and Latin America, with partial participation by advanced economies.
Whether entry into force within one year is credible for a compact of this breadth, when few comparable agreements have been ratified that quickly.
How to score a non-member: by the investment diverted from it, or as unaffected unless it competes directly with a member.
Whether the 20 per cent trade and 30 per cent investment effects add to world totals or are largely diverted from non-members.

15Commentary

No signed commentary in this build.

16Version and citation

Version: 0.5.0 · active · market-access-opening
Change log: 0.5.0 · 9 October 2026 · Rebuilt in the second pass from Emerging-market growth breakout: recast from a five-year growth run into a compact that enters into force, with onset shortened to months, non-member diversion made explicit and the macro-financial load lowered to Medium.
Full change log

Rating history

One row per edition. Each edition page is frozen at release; corrections are published as errata.

Edition	Rank	L2y	L10y	Systemic	National	Confidence	Edition view
2027	Not ranked	3Possible	4Likely	3Significant	4Major	medium	Open

Versions

Version	Date	Change
0.5.0	9 October 2026	Rebuilt in the second pass from Emerging-market growth breakout: recast from a five-year growth run into a compact that enters into force, with onset shortened to months, non-member diversion made explicit and the macro-financial load lowered to Medium.

Citation and downloads

Cite as

GINC (2027). Scenario S12 A cross-regional market access compact redirects investment, Scenario Library v0.5. scenarios.ginc.org/scenarios/market-access-opening

Content and data are published under CC BY 4.0.

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