Likelihood, two years: 3Possible; to end-2028
Likelihood, ten years: 4Likely; to end-2036
Systemic impact: 3Significant; global
National impact: 4Severe; typical highly exposed nation
Onset pace: Months
Duration (acute phase): 1 year (prices doubled for 18 months)
Warning time: Months
Scope: Global
Recovery horizon: Years
Capability load: Hard 1/3Soft 3/3Economic 3/3; domains loaded High
Concurrency: Standalone; triggers 6 · triggered by 3
Confidence · movement: medium; new

Rated at Standard Severe. Event reach: global event. Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5.

03Narrative

Dateline: September 2031

The losses were confirmed in two stages. In July 2029, after seven weeks of extreme heat during grain filling, crop surveys in the first producing region cut the expected wheat and maize harvest by almost a third. In October the second region, in the other hemisphere, reported that drought had reduced its planted area and yields by a similar margin. Taken together, the grain available for export from the two regions was 25 per cent below the five-year average.

Prices moved before the second report. By November international wheat, maize and rice prices were double their level of a year earlier, and they stayed near that level until the spring of 2031. Eleven governments restricted staple exports within ten weeks of the first report, most by quota or licence and a few by outright ban. Three of them were suppliers with normal harvests. Importers holding contracts found that cargoes were delayed, re-priced or cancelled under force majeure clauses. For the most exposed buyers, delivered volumes over the following year were 15 per cent below requirement.

The same drought lowered reservoirs. Hydropower output in the affected regions fell by a fifth, irrigation allocations were cut and two governments in a shared basin disputed releases from upstream dams. Gas-fired generation covered part of the gap and raised the cost of nitrogen fertiliser, which several producers had already stopped exporting. Farmers in importing countries applied less in the 2030 season and yields there fell, so the shortage lasted beyond the season in which it began.

Governments with physical reserves near their cities released them in the first three months. Those whose reserves were financial, or were stored at ports far from consumers, could not turn them into food at the pace required. Bread and rice subsidies that had cost 1 to 2 per cent of GDP doubled. Central banks in importing economies spent reserves defending their currencies as food import bills rose, and nine governments sought emergency balance of payments support. Humanitarian appeals for 2030 were less than half funded.

Rationing was introduced in fourteen countries. Where distribution was seen to be fair, it held. Where subsidised grain was diverted or queues were policed by force, protests spread from the capital to provincial towns, and two governments fell during 2030. Acute malnutrition among children under five rose in every low-income importing country that reported data. Herds were slaughtered early in the drought regions, and many small farms did not plant the following season because they could not finance seed and fertiliser.

Harvests recovered in 2031 and prices fell back within months. Stocks did not recover as quickly: the rebuilding of public reserves kept import demand high into 2032. The countries that came through with least damage had held reserves of the right grains near the people who needed them, had transfer systems that could reach households within weeks and had kept enough foreign exchange to buy when others could not.

The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.

04Summary

Extreme heat and drought cut exportable grain from two major producing regions by 25 per cent in the same season. Export restrictions by other suppliers and a fertiliser shortage prevent rapid substitution. International staple prices double and stay there for 18 months, and physical import availability falls 15 per cent for highly exposed buyers. Water shortages also constrain domestic harvests and power generation in the affected regions. Governments must protect nutrition and farm viability while managing scarce foreign exchange, cross-border water disputes and unrest over food distribution. Exporters that are not affected and holders of usable stocks gain; poor consumers, food importers and water-stressed producers lose.

05Historical anchors

Event	Date	What happened	Calibrates
World food price crisis	2007–2008	International rice prices roughly tripled between late 2007 and spring 2008 after India, Vietnam and other exporters restricted sales, although the world rice harvest had not failed. Wheat and maize prices also reached records. Unrest over food prices was reported in more than 30 countries and the prime minister of Haiti was dismissed in April 2008 after food riots.	Export restrictions and precautionary buying can double or triple a staple price without a large physical loss. It sets the price multiple and shows how quickly a price rise reaches public order in importing countries.
Russian wheat export ban	August 2010 to June 2011	A summer of extreme heat and drought cut Russia's grain harvest by about a third. The government banned grain exports from 15 August 2010 and kept the ban until 1 July 2011. International wheat prices rose by more than half over the summer, and bread prices rose in North African and Middle Eastern importers ahead of the unrest of 2011.	One heat event in one exporting region, followed by one ban, was enough to move the world wheat price. The specification doubles the number of regions and adds restrictions by suppliers whose harvests were normal.
Black Sea grain disruption	February 2022 to July 2023	Russia and Ukraine had together supplied more than a quarter of world wheat exports. Ukraine's seaports closed in late February 2022 and the FAO Food Price Index reached a record in March 2022. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, agreed on 22 July 2022, moved about 33 million tonnes before it lapsed in July 2023.	A loss of access to one exporting region, with the grain itself intact, produced a record price index and cancelled cargoes for importers in Africa and the Middle East. It calibrates the fall in physical availability for exposed buyers.
Fertiliser price spike	2021–2022	Nitrogen fertiliser prices roughly tripled between 2020 and spring 2022 as European gas prices rose, ammonia plants curtailed output, China and Russia restricted exports and sanctions cut Belarusian potash sales. Farmers in low-income countries reduced application in the following season.	The route by which a one-season shock lowers the next harvest. It supports the assumption that fertiliser cannot be substituted quickly and that the shortage outlasts the season in which it begins.
India rice export ban	July 2023	On 20 July 2023 India, which supplied about 40 per cent of world rice trade, prohibited exports of non-basmati white rice to restrain domestic prices after erratic monsoon rains. The FAO All Rice Price Index rose to its highest level in 15 years in the following months.	A supplier with adequate stocks restricted exports as a precaution. It shows that restrictions by unaffected exporters are a standing feature of the market and not an extreme assumption.
Lloyd's food and water shock scenario	October 2023	Lloyd's and the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies modelled extreme weather leading to food and water shortages at three severities. The probability-weighted global economic loss was US$5 trillion over five years.	The systemic impact rating. A loss near 1 per cent of five-year global output for the weighted case places the severe case at level 3.

06Parameters

Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.

Common variables at Standard Severe · read-only

1. Severity: major
severe (Standard Severe)
extreme
2. Duration (acute phase): 30 days
90 days
1 year (Standard Severe)
3 years
5 years
Standard Severe: 1 year (prices doubled for 18 months)
3. Onset pace: days
weeks
months (Standard Severe)
years
4. Warning time: none
days
months (Standard Severe)
5. Scope: national
regional
global (Standard Severe)
6. Origin: natural (Standard Severe)
accidental
adversarial (great power / neighbour / non-state)
negotiated
Standard Severe: natural (export restrictions follow)
7. External support: full
partial (Standard Severe)
none
8. Concurrency: standalone (Standard Severe)
plus one named scenario
plus two
9. Policy response assumed: none (pure exposure)
current plans executed (Standard Severe)
best practice
10. Recovery horizon: months
years (Standard Severe)
structural

Scenario-specific parameters · read-only

Parameter	Default	Range or options	Note
Producing regions failing in one season	2	1 to 3	Standard Major uses one region; Standard Extreme uses three.
Fall in exportable grain from the failing regions	25	15 to 40	Wheat, maize and rice taken together.
International staple price multiple	×2	×1.5 to ×3	Held for 18 months at the default; the period may be set from 9 to 36 months.
Fall in physical import availability for highly exposed buyers	15	5 to 30	Applies in full at High exposure and is scaled down for other nations.
Traded staple calories under export restriction	15	5 to 30	Includes restrictions by suppliers whose own harvests were normal.
Fertiliser application in the following season	10 per cent below normal	0 to 25	Carries the shock into a second harvest.
Hydropower output in the affected regions	20 per cent below normal	0 to 40	Stands for the wider water shortage, including irrigation allocations.

07Transmission channels

1
Heat and drought in two producing regions cut their exportable wheat, maize and rice by 25 per cent in one season.
2
International prices double within months as importers bid for the remaining supply and traders anticipate restrictions.
3
Other exporters restrict sales to hold down domestic prices, removing further supply and voiding contracts that importers relied on.
4
Physical availability for highly exposed importers falls 15 per cent; reserves held far from consumers or in financial form cannot fill the gap in time.
5
Low reservoirs cut irrigation and hydropower in the affected regions; gas demand for power raises fertiliser costs and states sharing a river dispute releases.
6
Food import bills and subsidies rise together, draining foreign exchange, widening deficits and passing food price inflation into wages and interest rates.
7
Rationing and price rises fall hardest on poor urban households; where distribution is seen as unfair, protest spreads and governments are challenged.
8
Lower fertiliser use, slaughtered herds and unplanted small farms reduce the next harvest, while child malnutrition leaves lasting losses in health and schooling.

08Capability loading

High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.

Domain	Load	Channel
Hard
Defence and security	Medium	Cross-border water disputes, guarding of food stores and convoys and armed forces drawn into distribution and public order.
Strategic infrastructure	High	Grain storage, ports, irrigation, water supply and hydropower run short or are in the wrong places.
Critical technology	Medium	Crop forecasting, drought-tolerant seed, precision irrigation and digital transfer systems decide how early and how well a nation responds.
Soft
Government effectiveness	High	Reserve release, rationing, targeted transfers and price policy must work within weeks and be seen as fair.
Human capital	High	Child malnutrition, maternal health and school attendance worsen; rural livelihoods are lost and workers migrate.
Influence and cohesion	High	Unrest over prices and distribution, strained relations with exporters and neighbours and contested official figures on stocks.
Economic
Macro-financial	High	Import bills and subsidies drain reserves and budgets; food price inflation, currency pressure and requests for emergency financing follow.
Industry, trade and supply	High	Cancelled cargoes, export restrictions, competition for freight and lower farm and food-processing output.
Energy and resources	High	Water, arable land and fertiliser are the binding constraints; hydropower falls and gas demand rises.

09Stakeholders

Government: Exposure
Reserve policy by grain and location, the reach of transfer systems, foreign exchange for imports and water-sharing agreements.
Actions
Hold physical reserves of the staples people eat, stored near consumers, with published release rules.
Link cash and food transfers to local prices so that support rises without a new decision.
Agree import contracts and water-sharing rules with suppliers and neighbours before a shortage.
Watch
Stocks-to-use ratios of the major exporters
Export restrictions announced by other governments
Reservoir levels and irrigation allocations
Technology: Exposure
Crop forecasting, irrigation control, cold chains and the payment systems that carry transfers; water and power for data centres in drought regions.
Actions
Supply governments with yield, soil moisture and stock estimates early enough to act on.
Keep payment and identity platforms available for emergency transfers at national scale.
Plan for restricted water and power at facilities in drought-affected basins.
Watch
Satellite crop condition and soil moisture indices
Hydropower output and grid notices in affected regions
Government requests for emergency transfer capacity
Investors: Exposure
Sovereign debt of food importers, agricultural commodities, fertiliser producers, food retailers, crop insurers and utilities dependent on hydropower.
Actions
Test portfolios against staple prices doubled for 18 months and a 15 per cent import shortfall.
Review sovereign exposures by food import bill, reserve cover and subsidy cost.
Check crop insurance and reinsurance accumulations across the two failing regions.
Watch
Export restriction announcements
Reserve cover of food-importing sovereigns
Fertiliser and natural gas prices
Public: Exposure
Food prices and availability, most acutely for poor urban households and for small farmers in drought regions.
Actions
Households: know how the national ration or transfer scheme registers people and where it distributes.
Local government: map stores, mills and distribution points and plan for orderly, fair queuing.
Media and civil society: report stock and distribution figures accurately to limit hoarding.
Watch
Retail prices of bread, rice and cooking oil
Subsidy, ration and transfer announcements
Child malnutrition screening results

10Regional exposure

Region	Exposure	Rationale
North America	Medium	Exporter with secure supply, but a candidate failing region; drought cuts western water and hydropower, and consumer food inflation rises.
Europe	Medium	Net cereal exporter with fertiliser tied to imported gas; southern water stress, food inflation and migration pressure from neighbouring importers.
China	High	Largest importer of soya beans and feed grain; northern water stress; large reserves soften the first year but rebuilding them tightens world supply.
Indo-Pacific	Medium	Rice importers such as the Philippines and Indonesia and import-dependent Pacific islands are exposed; Australia, Thailand and Vietnam export.
South Asia	High	Heat and a weak monsoon cut domestic wheat and rice; Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra waters are contested; undernutrition is high and fiscal space thin.
Gulf and Middle East	High	Most staples are imported and Egypt is among the largest wheat buyers; water is scarce and Nile, Tigris and Euphrates flows are disputed.
Africa	High	Import-dependent cities, rain-fed farming, fertiliser dependence, low reserves of grain and foreign exchange and high existing acute food insecurity.
Latin America and Caribbean	Medium	Brazil and Argentina export and may gain or fail; Caribbean and Central American importers and the dry corridor are exposed.
Russia and Eurasia	Medium	Russia and Kazakhstan gain as exporters unless they are a failing region; Central Asian water sharing and importers in the Caucasus are exposed.

11Early-warning indicators

Indicator	Source	Threshold
FAO Food Price Index, cereals sub-index	FAO	Cereals sub-index 30 per cent above its level a year earlier
Stocks-to-use ratios for wheat, maize and rice	Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) Market Monitor; USDA World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates	Stocks-to-use ratio of the major exporters at or below its lowest level of the past ten years
Crop conditions in the main producing regions	GEOGLAM Crop Monitor for AMIS	Poor or failure conditions reported for two major exporting regions in the same season
Food and fertiliser export restrictions in force	International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) export restrictions tracker	Restrictions covering more than 10 per cent of globally traded calories
Fertiliser prices: urea, DAP and potash	World Bank Commodity Price Data (the Pink Sheet)	Urea at twice its three-year average
El Niño and La Niña status and outlook	NOAA ENSO Diagnostic Discussion	An advisory in force during the growing season of two major producing regions
Acute food insecurity classifications	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC); Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)	Population in IPC Phase 3 or above rising in three or more regions at once
Food import bills of low-income food-deficit countries	FAO Food Outlook	—

12Compounds

Triggers: S05 Legitimacy rupture · Unrest over food prices and distribution weakens accepted authority and can turn a contested succession into a breakdown of administration.
S03 Regional war spillover · Disputes over shared rivers and scarce grain raise the risk of armed confrontation between neighbours; a contributing cause only.
S16 Water-efficient food leap · A food availability crisis raises the urgency and financing of seed approval, irrigation and storage programmes.
S07 Core disaster · The heat and drought behind the breadbasket failures can produce the heat emergency or fire variant in the same season.
S10 Severe pandemic · Food scarcity raises vulnerability to infection and increases contact with wildlife and livestock.
S11 Debt service reset · Food import bills exhaust the foreign exchange of indebted importers
Triggered by: S03 Regional war spillover · A closed sea route blocks grain and fertiliser cargoes and raises gas prices, producing the same import shortfall without a harvest failure.
S01 Trade bloc rupture · Export controls and bloc restrictions on fertiliser and farm inputs reduce harvests and make food export restrictions more likely.
S07 Core disaster · Only where the core is also a major grain-producing or grain-exporting region; the loss then counts as one of the two failures.
Amplified by: S02 Global funding seizure · A funding seizure removes trade finance and market access when importers most need foreign exchange.
S07 Core disaster · A disaster at a port or storage concentration removes the reserves and handling capacity that the response depends on.
S10 Severe pandemic · Workplace absence and movement controls reduce farm labour, port throughput and food distribution.
Amplifying trends: Climate change & physical riskFreshwater stress & transboundary waterAgricultural soil degradationStaple food export concentrationFertiliser supply dependenceFood storage & cold chainsStrategic stockpiles & reservesPersistent nutritional deprivation
Key trends: Climate change & physical riskCritical Fertiliser supply dependenceCritical Staple food export concentrationCritical Commodity dependence & price volatilityVery high Persistent nutritional deprivationVery high Structural inflation pressureVery high Freshwater stress & transboundary waterVery high
From GINC Trends: the trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario, of 250. All S06 trend scores.

13Rating rationale

Rating	Band or level	Why
Likelihood, two years	3Possible	Shocks with one failing region or one major restricting exporter occurred in 2007–2008, 2010, 2012, 2022 and 2023, about once every three years. None combined a 25 per cent loss of exportable grain in two regions with prices doubled for 18 months. The joint event is rarer than its parts, and the panel places it at 1 to 5 per cent over two years.
Likelihood, ten years	4Likely	Warming raises the frequency of extreme heat during grain filling and the chance that droughts in separate regions coincide. Exports of wheat, maize, rice and soya beans remain concentrated in a small number of suppliers, and export restrictions have become a routine response to high prices. Over ten years the panel judges an event of this severity likely, at 5 to 25 per cent.
Systemic impact	3Significant	Lloyd's puts the probability-weighted loss from a food and water shock at US$5 trillion over five years, close to 1 per cent of global output. This specification sits at the severe end of that range, with prices doubled for 18 months, which places it within 1 to 2.5 per cent. Food is a small share of output in advanced economies, which keeps the global loss below level 4.
National impact	4Severe	For a highly exposed importer, a 15 per cent fall in physical availability and doubled prices for 18 months mean rationing, higher child malnutrition, a doubled subsidy bill and reserve losses. In 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 smaller price rises were followed by unrest in importing countries. The panel sets level 4, not 5: the specification is a shortage with recovery within years, not famine or state failure.
Confidence	medium	The price and trade mechanisms are well documented from recent episodes. The probability that two regions fail together and the size of the import shortfall rest on climate modelling and judgement.

Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the scenario methodology page.

14Open questions

Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.

Whether a 25 per cent fall in exportable grain from two regions is the right Standard Severe level, or whether one failing region with widespread export restrictions produces the same result for importers.
How to record exporters that gain from higher prices in a downside record that measures loss.
Whether deliberate restriction of a shared river by an upstream state, which the first-pass record included, now needs a scenario of its own.
Whether national impact at level 4 understates the outcome for low-income importers already in acute food insecurity, where the first-pass record set level 5.

15Commentary

No signed commentary in this build.

16Version and citation

Version: 0.5.0 · active · breadbasket-failure
Change log: 0.5.0 · 9 October 2026 · Rebuilt in the second pass from Food and water system shock: narrowed to a named event, two producing regions failing in one season; deliberate restriction of a shared river is no longer a route into the scenario; national impact lowered from 5 to 4; loads on strategic infrastructure, critical technology and macro-financial raised.
Full change log

Rating history

One row per edition. Each edition page is frozen at release; corrections are published as errata.

Edition	Rank	L2y	L10y	Systemic	National	Confidence	Edition view
2027	4	3Possible	4Likely	3Significant	4Severe	medium	Open

Versions

Version	Date	Change
0.5.0	9 October 2026	Rebuilt in the second pass from Food and water system shock: narrowed to a named event, two producing regions failing in one season; deliberate restriction of a shared river is no longer a route into the scenario; national impact lowered from 5 to 4; loads on strategic infrastructure, critical technology and macro-financial raised.

Citation and downloads

Cite as

GINC (2027). Scenario S06 Two breadbasket failures trigger a food availability crisis, Scenario Library v0.5. scenarios.ginc.org/scenarios/breadbasket-failure

Content and data are published under CC BY 4.0.

Download JSON Download CSV