Likelihood, two years: 2Unlikely; to end-2028
Likelihood, ten years: 3Possible; to end-2036
Systemic impact: 1Limited; global
National impact: 4Severe; typical highly exposed nation
Onset pace: Weeks
Duration (acute phase): 1 year (acute dispute six months)
Warning time: Months (the contested date is known in advance)
Scope: National
Recovery horizon: Years
Capability load: Hard 1/3Soft 2/3Economic 1/3; domains loaded High
Concurrency: Standalone; triggers 4 · triggered by 9
Confidence · movement: medium; new

Rated at Standard Severe. Event reach: single-nation event (Rated for a given nation. The first-pass record counted any government that fell to protest or coup and was rated two bands higher; this record requires six months of competing claims.). Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5.

Load test: results by nation

03Narrative

Dateline: October 2031

The presidential runoff was held on 6 October 2030. The electoral commission announced a margin of 0.8 percentage points on 9 October, after a three-day delay in the count in two provinces. Within hours a video appearing to show ballot papers being loaded into an unmarked vehicle had been viewed 14 million times. Forensic analysts established within two days that it was synthetic. The correction reached about a tenth of that audience. Both candidates declared victory. On 21 October the constitutional court suspended certification pending a review of evidence of foreign-funded online campaigning. The outgoing government treated the order as binding. The declared winner did not.

By November there were two claimants to the presidency, each citing a lawful basis. Protests recurred weekly in the capital and four provincial cities. Election officials and three judges received coordinated threats, and two regional returning officers resigned. Police commanders in two provinces declined orders to clear occupied administrative buildings. One army garrison stated that it would take instructions only from the court. No unit changed sides and there was no sustained armed confrontation.

Normal administration stopped in provinces containing about 20 per cent of the population. Tax offices and customs posts there closed or remitted to provincial authorities, and national revenue ran 15 per cent below plan between November and March. Teachers and health workers in those provinces were paid late in four of the six months. Clinics reported shortages of basic medicines. The statistics office suspended two releases after both sides challenged its figures, and the central bank set policy without them.

The currency fell 18 per cent in six weeks. Two bond auctions were cancelled and the government financed itself through short-term bills taken up by domestic banks. Mobile data was restricted on eleven days under an emergency decree that was renewed twice. Firms postponed investment. Permits and contract payments that needed a ministerial signature went unsigned because officials could not establish who was authorised to give it.

A mediated agreement in April 2031 set a rerun under a reconstituted commission, with regional observers and an agreed protocol for testing evidence. The rerun was held in September 2031 and the losing side accepted the result. Output for 2031 was 5 per cent below the path forecast before the vote. The emergency decree lapsed, but three of its provisions on public assembly had been written into ordinary law, and surveys showed that fewer than a third of respondents trusted the commission to run the next election.

Roads, power stations and ministries were undamaged throughout. For six months the state lacked agreement on who was entitled to direct them.

The dateline is illustrative, not a forecast. The narrative is hypothetical; the historical anchors below are real events.

04Summary

A disputed election, succession or constitutional ruling produces competing claims to lawful authority in one nation. Fabricated evidence and coordinated intimidation of officials intensify the dispute. For six months, recurrent protests and selective security-force refusals prevent normal administration in areas containing 20 per cent of the population. Revenue collection and essential service delivery fall, and national output runs 5 per cent below its previous path. Courts and official information become contested instruments. Physical assets are undamaged. The state must restore accepted authority without normalising repression or permanent emergency powers.

05Historical anchors

Event	Date	What happened	Calibrates
Côte d'Ivoire post-election crisis	November 2010 to April 2011	After the runoff of 28 November 2010 the electoral commission and the Constitutional Council declared different winners and both candidates were sworn in. The stand-off lasted about four months, with around 3,000 deaths, the closure of commercial banks and a halt to cocoa exports. It ended by force in April 2011. Output contracted by roughly 4 per cent in 2011.	The closest match to the defining condition: two claimants, each with an institutional basis. It supports the output shortfall of 5 per cent and marks the upper bound, since violence exceeded what Standard Severe assumes.
Kenya post-election crisis	December 2007 to February 2008	The presidential result announced on 30 December 2007 was disputed. Two months of violence followed, in which more than 1,000 people were killed and several hundred thousand displaced. A mediated power-sharing agreement was signed on 28 February 2008. Growth fell from about 7 per cent in 2007 to below 2 per cent in 2008, a year that also included drought and the global downturn.	The scale of the output loss, the role of outside mediation and the recovery horizon: constitutional reform followed in 2010 and the next election passed without comparable violence.
Bolivia disputed election	October to November 2019	The count in the election of 20 October 2019 was disputed after reporting of preliminary results was interrupted. Three weeks of protest followed. Police units in several cities refused orders from 8 November, an audit by the Organisation of American States reported irregularities and the president resigned on 10 November. A fresh election was not held until October 2020.	Selective security-force refusal as the turning point, reached within three weeks, and the length of the interim: a year passed before an accepted vote.
Romania's annulled presidential election	6 December 2024	The Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential election, held on 24 November, two days before the scheduled runoff. It relied on declassified intelligence assessments describing a coordinated online campaign and undeclared campaign financing. The election was rerun in May 2025.	The court as a contested instrument: a ruling made to protect the vote was read by a large minority as the removal of their choice. Administration continued, which marks the lower bound of the event.
United States Capitol	6 January 2021	A crowd entered the Capitol while Congress was counting electoral votes. The count was suspended for several hours and completed in the early hours of 7 January. The transfer of power took place on the constitutional date.	The advanced-democracy variant. Certification was disrupted for hours, not months, and courts, election officials and security forces held. This is the basis for the Medium exposure of North America.
Brasília	8 January 2023	One week after the inauguration, supporters of the defeated candidate entered and damaged the Congress, Supreme Court and presidential palace buildings. Security forces cleared the buildings the same day and more than 1,000 people were detained.	The effect of security-force compliance. Where the chain of command held, a challenge to the result was contained in a day and did not reach administration or revenue.

06Parameters

Shown at their preset values. Parameters are not adjustable in this release and nothing on this page is computed from them. Custom settings run (Phase B) but are labelled 'non-standard run' and excluded from comparisons.

Common variables at Standard Severe · read-only

1. Severity: major
severe (Standard Severe)
extreme
2. Duration (acute phase): 30 days
90 days
1 year (Standard Severe)
3 years
5 years
Standard Severe: 1 year (acute dispute six months)
3. Onset pace: days
weeks (Standard Severe)
months
years
4. Warning time: none
days
months (Standard Severe)
Standard Severe: months (the contested date is known in advance)
5. Scope: national (Standard Severe)
regional
global
6. Origin: natural
accidental
adversarial (great power / neighbour / non-state) (Standard Severe)
negotiated
Standard Severe: adversarial (domestic factions, with foreign manipulation)
7. External support: full
partial (Standard Severe)
none
8. Concurrency: standalone (Standard Severe)
plus one named scenario
plus two
9. Policy response assumed: none (pure exposure)
current plans executed (Standard Severe)
best practice
10. Recovery horizon: months
years (Standard Severe)
structural

Scenario-specific parameters · read-only

Parameter	Default	Range or options	Note
Trigger	disputed election	options: disputed election / succession / constitutional ruling	The trigger must produce at least two claimants, each citing a lawful basis.
Duration of competing claims	6 months	2 to 18	Measured from the disputed act to an accepted settlement or rerun date.
Population under impaired administration	20 per cent	10 to 40	Areas where national tax, justice and payroll functions do not operate normally.
Output shortfall against the prior path	5 per cent	2 to 10	First full year after the disputed act.
Revenue shortfall during the dispute	15 per cent below plan	5 to 30	A GINC working assumption; the specification states only that revenue collection falls.
Security-force compliance	selective refusals	options: full compliance / selective refusals / open split	An open split belongs to Standard Extreme.
Fabricated evidence and intimidation	coordinated, partly foreign	options: sporadic / coordinated domestic / coordinated, partly foreign	Covers synthetic media, forged documents and threats against election officials and judges.

07Transmission channels

1
A disputed count, succession or ruling produces two claimants, each citing a lawful basis.
2
Fabricated evidence spreads faster than verification, while officials and judges face coordinated intimidation.
3
Recurrent protest and counter-protest occupy administrative centres in contested areas.
4
Security forces obey selectively, so neither claimant can enforce orders across the whole territory.
5
Courts, the electoral body and the statistics office lose accepted authority as each side rejects adverse findings.
6
Tax collection, payroll and essential services falter in areas holding a fifth of the population.
7
Capital leaves, the currency falls and the government loses access to term funding.
8
A mediated settlement restores a single authority, with emergency powers and distrust carried forward.

08Capability loading

High: capability band shifts expected under current plans. Medium: band shifts under 'none' policy response only. Low: strain without band shift. Loads are judgement-based until the Atlas connects. Domains link to the Atlas.

Domain	Load	Channel
Hard
Defence and security	High	Selective refusal of orders splits the chain of command; forces are drawn into internal order.
Strategic infrastructure	Medium	Assets are undamaged, but occupations, unpaid staff and data restrictions interrupt transport, health and communications services.
Critical technology	Medium	Synthetic media, election systems and platform restrictions are contested; verification capacity is tested.
Soft
Government effectiveness	High	Electoral administration, courts, revenue collection and continuity of government lose accepted authority.
Human capital	Medium	Schools and clinics close or go unpaid in contested areas; professionals emigrate.
Influence and cohesion	High	Official information is disbelieved, polarisation hardens and partners withhold recognition.
Economic
Macro-financial	High	Capital flight, currency depreciation, cancelled auctions and a revenue shortfall.
Industry, trade and supply	Medium	Investment is postponed; permits, customs and contract payments stall without an authorised signatory.
Energy and resources	Low	Supply continues; subsidy decisions and resource revenues become objects of the dispute.

09Stakeholders

Government: Exposure
Electoral administration, courts, security-force chain of command, revenue collection and the credibility of official information.
Actions
Agree before the vote how results are verified, how complaints are heard and by what date.
Set lawful rules for policing protest and for the limits and expiry of emergency powers.
Plan payroll, revenue and service continuity for a period without an agreed head of government.
Watch
Resignations of, and threats against, election officials and judges
Statements by police and military commanders on whose orders they accept
Revenue remitted by provincial tax and customs offices
Technology: Exposure
Platforms carrying fabricated evidence, operators of election and results systems and telecommunications operators subject to restriction orders.
Actions
Establish provenance checks and rapid verification channels with the electoral body before the vote.
Secure results transmission and publish polling-station counts in a form that can be audited.
Define the legal process required before complying with a shutdown or data restriction order.
Watch
Reach of synthetic media against reach of corrections
Coordinated inauthentic accounts amplifying either claimant
Shutdown and throttling orders and their legal basis
Investors: Exposure
Sovereign debt, currency, domestic banks holding government paper and firms dependent on permits and public contracts.
Actions
Include a contested transfer of power in sovereign and country risk models around the electoral calendar.
Test contracts and guarantees against a period in which the lawful signatory is disputed.
Review exposure to domestic banks that become the residual buyer of government bills.
Watch
Sovereign spreads and currency moves in the 30 days around a vote
Auction cancellations and the shift to short-term bills
Recognition decisions by multilateral lenders and major partners
Public: Exposure
Personal safety, the reliability of information and access to pay, health care and schooling in contested areas.
Actions
Rely on published polling-station counts and accredited observer statements, not on unverified footage.
Local authorities keep clinics, schools and water services operating under either claimant.
Civil society and media document intimidation and the use of emergency powers.
Watch
Official results channels and observer statements
Curfews, assembly restrictions and data shutdowns
Late payment of public salaries and shortages at clinics

10Regional exposure

Region	Exposure	Rationale
North America	Medium	Certification was disrupted in 2021 and polarisation is high, but courts, officials and security forces held.
Europe	Medium	Romania's 2024 annulment shows the judicial pathway; administration is generally robust to a disputed result.
China	Low	No electoral transfer; a succession dispute would follow a different pathway from the one specified.
Indo-Pacific	Medium	Disputed counts and military involvement have precedents in parts of ASEAN and the Pacific; advanced economies are less exposed.
South Asia	High	Bangladesh in 2024 and Nepal in 2025 show rapid loss of authority; disputed elections and politicised courts recur.
Gulf and Middle East	High	Succession and constitutional rulings are the likely triggers; several states have armed groups outside the state chain of command.
Africa	High	Kenya in 2007 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 are the direct precedents; coups have followed disputed mandates.
Latin America and Caribbean	High	Bolivia in 2019 and Venezuela since 2019 show disputed counts leading to rival claims and police refusals.
Russia and Eurasia	High	Disputed counts have brought mass protest and annulment in the region, with open external backing for incumbents or challengers.

11Early-warning indicators

Indicator	Source	Threshold
Protest and riot events, including events involving state forces	ACLED	Weekly events above three times the trailing 12-month average for four consecutive weeks
Clean elections index and election management body autonomy	V-Dem Institute, Varieties of Democracy dataset	A fall of 0.1 or more on the 0 to 1 scale between annual releases
Trust in national government	OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions; Edelman Trust Barometer	Below 30 per cent with a national vote or succession due within 12 months
Election observation findings on the count and the complaints process	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; regional observer missions	A preliminary statement that declines to confirm the count
Constraints on government powers and judicial independence	World Justice Project Rule of Law Index	A decline in two consecutive editions
Internet shutdowns and platform restrictions	Access Now, #KeepItOn coalition	Any national or provincial shutdown during an electoral period
Sovereign spread and exchange rate around the electoral calendar	J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Diversified; national central bank	Spread widening of 200 basis points within 30 days of a vote
Takedowns of coordinated inauthentic networks naming the nation	Meta Adversarial Threat Report	—

12Compounds

Triggers: S04 Hybrid coercion · A divided chain of command and contested attribution lower the cost of a hostile hybrid campaign.
S03 Regional war spillover · Only where the nation is strategically placed and neighbours back rival claimants.
S02 Global funding seizure · Only where the nation is a reserve-currency issuer or a major financial centre.
S10 Severe pandemic · A state without effective government detects and reports an outbreak late.
Triggered by: S02 Global funding seizure · Loss of market access and forced spending cuts precede a contested vote.
S04 Hybrid coercion · Information operations and intimidation are part of the hostile campaign and can be aimed at a transfer of power.
S06 Breadbasket failure · Food shortages and unrest over distribution weaken the incumbent's mandate before a vote.
S08 AI labour shock · Abrupt displacement erodes trust in economic opportunity and raises support for rejecting results.
S07 Core disaster · A relief effort seen as failed or unfair, close to an election or succession, can open a dispute over lawful authority.
S09 Cryptographic trust break · Forged signatures and contested official records feed competing claims to lawful authority.
S10 Severe pandemic · Contested emergency measures and postponed votes weaken the lawful authority of governments.
S14 Middle East settlement · Factions that reject the terms may dispute a signatory government's authority
S15 Clean power threshold · Fiscal retrenchment in hydrocarbon-dependent states
Amplified by: S09 Cryptographic trust break · Forged digital signatures make official results and court documents harder to authenticate.
S10 Severe pandemic · Postponed votes and emergency health powers extend the period of contested authority.
Amplifying trends: Election integrity & interferenceForeign information manipulationDeclining institutional trustPolarisation & populismCivil unrest & protest mobilisationRule of law & judicial independenceExecutive overreach & emergency powersSynthetic media & deepfakes
Key trends: Rule of law & judicial independenceCritical Polarisation & populismCritical Election integrity & interferenceCritical State capacity & deliveryVery high Executive overreach & emergency powersVery high Declining institutional trustVery high Erosion of rights & civic freedomsVery high Civil unrest & protest mobilisationVery high Misinformation & disinformationVery high Synthetic media & deepfakesVery high State fragility & intrastate violenceVery high
From GINC Trends: the trends rated Very high or Critical for this scenario, of 250. All S05 trend scores.

13Rating rationale

Rating	Band or level	Why
Likelihood, two years	2Unlikely	The Standard Severe event is demanding: competing claims held for six months, impaired administration for a fifth of the population and a 5 per cent output shortfall. Disputed results are frequent, but most are settled within days or weeks, as in the United States in 2021, Brazil in 2023 and Romania in 2024. Cases meeting the full definition, such as Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and Bolivia in 2019, number fewer than one a year across 197 nations.
Likelihood, ten years	3Possible	Fewer than one qualifying case a year across 197 nations gives a given nation between 1 and 5 per cent over ten years. The rate is not uniform: it clusters where electoral administration is weak, succession rules are unsettled or courts are already contested. Synthetic media and declining institutional trust push the rate upward, but the evidence does not yet support a higher band for the typical nation.
Systemic impact	1Limited	The event strikes one nation and leaves its physical assets intact. A 5 per cent output shortfall in a typical exposed economy is well under 0.5 per cent of global output over five years. Spillovers reach neighbours, creditors and remittance flows and no further. The rating assumes the nation is not a great power or a reserve-currency issuer.
National impact	4Severe	Output runs 5 per cent below path, revenue and essential services fall in areas holding a fifth of the population and security forces obey selectively. Essential services, security and social cohesion are all reached. Level 5 is not reached because infrastructure is undamaged, there is no sustained armed conflict and accepted authority can be restored within one to three years, as in Kenya after 2008.
Confidence	medium	All three panel members held the scenario and two agreed on every rating; the third rated each one band higher. The base rate moves with where the six-month threshold is drawn.

Source of scores: model-panel-v0.5. Confidence refers to the rating, not the scenario. Calibration sources are listed with the anchors above and on the scenario methodology page.

14Open questions

Contested assumptions for the panel to resolve.

Whether one Standard Severe definition can serve both advanced democracies, where disputes have so far been settled in days, and states with weak electoral administration.
How to rate systemic impact when the nation is a great power or a reserve-currency issuer; the level 1 rating assumes it is not.
Whether the output and revenue shortfalls should be set by income group, given that the evidence rests mainly on Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire.
Where this scenario ends and S04 begins when foreign manipulation is the main driver of the dispute.

15Commentary

No signed commentary in this build.

16Version and citation

Version: 0.5.0 · active · legitimacy-rupture
Change log: 0.5.0 · 9 October 2026 · Rebuilt in the second pass from Political legitimacy crisis: narrowed to a disputed transfer of power lasting six months, likelihood lowered two bands and each impact one level, infrastructure and industry loads raised to Medium, Gulf and Middle East and Russia and Eurasia raised to High.
Full change log

Rating history

One row per edition. Each edition page is frozen at release; corrections are published as errata.

Edition	Rank	L2y	L10y	Systemic	National	Confidence	Edition view
2027	8	2Unlikely	3Possible	1Limited	4Severe	medium	Open

Versions

Version	Date	Change
0.5.0	9 October 2026	Rebuilt in the second pass from Political legitimacy crisis: narrowed to a disputed transfer of power lasting six months, likelihood lowered two bands and each impact one level, infrastructure and industry loads raised to Medium, Gulf and Middle East and Russia and Eurasia raised to High.

Citation and downloads

Cite as

GINC (2027). Scenario S05 A disputed transfer of power breaks effective government, Scenario Library v0.5. scenarios.ginc.org/scenarios/legitimacy-rupture

Content and data are published under CC BY 4.0.

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